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Men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual undertakings, and of the
advantages of fulfilling them... If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order
to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within
the reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple,
and, having seized his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to
miss theirs.
Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality among Men (1755)
Abstract
The great part of environmental problems, like global warming, depletion of ozone layer
or loss of biological diversity, are related to global commons and, for that, require global
policies. During the last three decades, many times countries organized meetings to find
an agreement on pollution control. The Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol or the
several Conference of Parties (COP) in the last years are just few examples. At the
same time, a big amount of scientist worked on the problem. Climatologist, ecologist
and biologist tried and try to suggest possible solutions or design future scenarios.
But the problem is also an economic problem. Economists found a natural approach to
the question in game theory. The first attempts set the issue in a static context (see e.g,
[CS93], [Bar94]). But pollution is an evolving phenomenon, so a dynamic game approach
can lead to more explicative results. Both in static and dynamic context, the literature
is divided into two streams: cooperative and non-cooperative games. The main focus of
the first stream is contrast the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions and show the
benefits of cooperation. The real question in these games is how to allocate the payoff
among players.
The non-cooperative stream starts from the consideration that there’s no a supranational
authority that can force countries to cooperate, so players choose non-cooperatively
whether join or not in a coalition. In this games it is necessary to specify the concept
of stability of the coalition. The terms most commonly used are those of internal and
external stability (see [dAs+83]). In few words, these two conditions say that a coalition
is stable if none of the members has an incentive to defect from cooperation and none
of non-members has an incentive to join. So, the two focus points are research of the
solutions (emissions or abatement level) and research of the coalition’s dimension.
We consider myopic players, that is to say that economic interests are still too strong
than environmental concern. It could be a limited point of view. There are relevant
examples, like EU, that put into the foreground the control of emissions. But, with
the arrival of the new millennium, the economic center of the world has changed his
coordinates, and with it the center of environmental problems. The great challenge
now is to include in emissions reduction process those countries that are not considered
developed countries, but that give significant contribution to pollution (e.g, the countries
called BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). We think that it’s not realistic
to ask to those countries to take care of environment for some kind of farsightedness or
consider some kind of punishment for those who not cooperate.
So, we want try to design an IEA that’s profitable. A classical result of the non-
cooperative game theoretic literature supports only small coalition. But in reality, the
principal agreements are signed by many countries.
The focus of this Thesis is to analyze if the presence of a Social Externality (see [CR06]),
can lead to a large coalition. The hypothesis is that when countries have to make the
decision to join or not an agreement, they consider all possible earnings due to relations
with other countries.
We divide the world in two classes of countries, developed and developing, assuming
that there is asymmetry between them, and homogeneity within each class.
In Chapter 1, we present some basic concepts of Dynamic Optimization and Game The-
ory. We first introduce the Optimal Control Theory, we show the Bolza problem and
the Pontryagin Minimum Principle. Than, we extend the discussion to Dynamic Pro-
gramming, comparing it and showing a method to find the optimal solutions.
Dynamic Programming is the method we use to find Nash equilibrium in dynamic con-
text.
In the second part of the Chapter we introduce Game Theory, we give a definition of
a Global Emission Game and Nash equilibrium, we introduce Dynamic Games and we
discuss about Partial Cooperative Equilibrium. We conclude discussing about Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements, and some literature about them.
In Chapter 2, we present our first model. It is a static N -player game with asymmetric
countries. We assume that a part of the players join in coalition, the rest acts non-
cooperatively. We characterize emission solutions and than we discuss about stability
assuming that the players are divided in two homogenous groups: developed and devel-
oping countries.
We also assume that a Social Externality affects the welfare of cooperators.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the Externality concept in a dynamic framework. We pro-
pose a Two-player differential game, in which player 1 represents developed countries,
while player 2 represents developing countries. For developing country we assume a
gradual involvement in environmental concern.
We find the feedback Nash equilibrium of the game and we discuss the stability of the
agreement between the two players, adapting the definition of a self-enforcing agree-
ments. Moreover, we do not impose that the cooperation starts from the outset of the
game.
In Chapter 4, we extend the previous differential game assuming a world with N coun-
tries. We divide it in two asymmetric groups, developed and developing, maintaining
the hypothesis of gradual involvement of developing countries. We characterize emis-
sion solutions both for cooperators and defectors, and we discuss about the size and
composition of a stable coalition.
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
In this Chapter we recall the Economic and Mathematical basis that we need to de-
velop our models. So, we describe elements of Optimal Control Theory and Dynamic
Programming, that are the frameworks and the instruments we use to find the Nash
equilibrium in differential games.
Moreover we provide an introduction to Game Theory. We consider non-cooperative
games, and we explain the notion of partial cooperative equilibrium. We discuss first
about static games, introducing the basic concepts which define a game and the notion
of Nash equilibrium, than we introduce dynamic game with continuos time.
Finally we introduce International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), with some liter-
ature and an explanation of the concept of Social Externality.
The Chapter is divided as follows: in Section 1 we introduce Dynamic Optimization; in
Section 2 we discuss about Game Theory; in Section 3 we present International Envi-
ronmental Agreements.
1
Preliminaries 2
1.1 Dynamic Optimization
Dynamic Optimization is a mathematical discipline who deals with maximization or
minimization problems in a dynamic context. One of the first examples in Calculus of
Variations is the famous brachistocrone problem proposed by J. Bernoulli in 1696.
Then the theory has been greatly developed and applied in different disciplines, such
as physics, engineering and economics. Calculus of Variations, Optimal Control Theory
and Dynamic Programming are the principal areas in which we can divide Dynamic
Optimization, and they are clearly linked between their. For our scopes, we move within
the framework of Optimal Control Theory and Dynamic Programming.
For a brief introduction to Optimal Control Theory and Dynamic Programming see
[Eva10]. For an exhaustive discussion see [KS91] and [FS06].
1.1.1 Introduction to Optimal Control Theory
Consider a differential equation that describes how a system evolves from a starting
point. The state variable, also called trajectory, is the function we need to describe in
which state is the system in every time t. Sometimes the state can be controlled by
another variable, that we call control variable. So, mathematically, we have a controlled
system: 
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
x(0) = x0.
(1.1)
Assuming U to be a closed set of Rn, we call a piecewise continuos function u : [0, T ]→
U ⊂ Rn the control variable and x(·) ∈ A, A = {x ∈ C1? ([0, T ];Rn) : x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn}1,
the state variable, and f : [0, T ]× Rn × U → R.
First of all, we assume standard hypothesis for the existence and the uniqueness of a
solution of the system (1.1), as in the following modification of Picard Theorem:
Lemma 1.1. Let f : [0, T ] × Rn × U → R a Lipschitz continuous and sublinear in
x function, uniformly with respect to t and u, that is there exists K > 0 such that
1We denote with C?([a, b];Rn) the space of piecewise continuos functions f : [a, b] → Rn and with
C1?([a, b];Rn) the space of piecewise continuosly differentiable functions f : [a, b]→ Rn.
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∀t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U and x, y ∈ Rn
|f(t, x, u)− f(t, y, u)| ≤ K|x− y|, |f(t, x, u)| ≤ K(1 + |x|). (1.2)
Then for any fixed control u ∈ C?([0, T ], U) there exists a unique solution x to (1.1),
that is a piecewise C1 function that satisfies the system up to the discontinuity point of
the control variable u.
We can interpret the solution of (1.1) as the dynamical evolution of the system. This
function, that we should correctly write x(·, u(·), x0), depends upon the control u(·) and
the initial point x0. The issue now is: what is the optimal control u for the system (1.1)?
To answer this question we need to introduce a “cost” criterion, that’s a functional J(u),
in integral form:
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(t, x(t), u(t))dt+ φT (x(T )).
So, we choose the control u(·) that is optimal in the sense that minimizes the functional
J(u).
Definition 1.2. Suppose that U ⊂ Rn is a closed set, f ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn × U) satisfies
the conditions (1.2) and that L : [0, T ]×Rn×U → R and φ : Rn → R are continuos and
bounded from below functions. Then we call Bolza problem the following:
inf
u(·)
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(t, xx0(t), u(t))dt+ φT (x
x0(T )), (1.3)
where u ∈ C?([0, T ], U) and xx0(·, u) ∈ C1? ([0, T ],Rn) is a solution of
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
x(0) = x0.
(1.4)
The principle we use to find the optimal control is due to the work of Pontryagin and
in order to show it, we want first introduce the concepts of costate and Hamiltonian.
A costate is a function p(·) that we can interpret as a sort of Lagrange multiplier. The
basic idea of Pontryagin principle is that if u?(·) is an optimal control then there exists
a costate p?(·) that’s optimal in some way. The Hamiltonian in control theory is a
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function, H, defined as follows:
H(x, p, u) := f(x, u) · p+ L(x, u).
So, for the Bolza problem we can formulate the Pontryagin Minimum Principle as follows:
Theorem 1.3 (Pontryagin Minimum Principle). Assume u?(·) is an optimal control
and let x?(·) the corresponding trajectory. Then, there exists a function p? : [0, T ]→ Rn
such that
x˙?(t) = ∇pH(x?(t), p?(t), u?(t)), (1.5)
p˙?(t) = −∇xH(x?(t), p?(t), u?(t)), (1.6)
and
H(x?(t), p?(t), u?(t)) = min
u
H(x?(t), p?(t), u), (1.7)
in any continuity point t of u?.
Moreover, we have the final condition:
p?(T ) = ∇φ(x?(T )),
and that the mapping t 7→ H(x?(t), p?(t), u?(t)) is constant.
Let us present some classical examples.
Example 1.1. Consider the classical Nordhaus Model. So, we have a country near
to election day. To maintain the power, the party in charge of the government takes
decisions only on two economic variables: u, the unemployment rate, and pi, the inflation
rate. These two variables enter in a vote function V = V (u, pi), which represents how
many votes the management of unemployment and inflation can bring to the ruling party.
For the function V we assume that is a decreasing function of u and pi:
∂V
∂u
< 0,
∂V
∂pi
< 0.
Moreover, u and pi are related through the Phillips tradeoff relation:
p(t) = φ(u(t)) + api(t),
Preliminaries 5
where φ is a decreasing function, a ∈ (0, 1] is a constant and pi is the expected rate of
inflation, solution of the following differential equation:
p˙i(t) = b(p(t)− pi(t)), b is a positive constant.
Assuming T to be the time left to election, the problem that the incumbent party has to
resolve is:
max
u
∫ T
0
V (u(t), φ(u(t)))ertdt,
subject to 
p˙i(t) = bφ(u(t)) + b(a− 1)pi(t)
pi(0) = pi0,
where r > 0 and ert is a decay memory factor, that’s to say that actions near to the vote
are more important for the voters. In the Nordhaus framework
φ(u) = j − ku, V (u, pi) = −(u2 + hp), j, k, h > 0.
Substituting into the maximization problem and taking account of the sign of V , we can
rewrite
min
u
∫ T
0
[u2(t) + h(j − ku(t) + api(t))]ertdt,
subject to 
p˙i(t) = b[j − ku(t) + (a− 1)pi(t)]
pi(0) = pi0.
The Hamiltonian of this problem is:
H(t, pi, u, λ) = ert[u2 + h(j − ku+ api)] + λb[j − ku+ (a− 1)pi].
So, if u? is optimal, then we have
∂H
∂u
= 2uert − hkert − bkλ = 0.
Since ∂2H/∂u2 = 2ert > 0, then the unique minimum u? is
u?(t) =
hk
2
+
bk
2
λ?(t)e−rt,
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where the co-state λ?(t) solves the differential equation

λ˙(t) = −∂H∂pi (t, pi?(t), λ(t)) = ahert + b(a− 1)λ(t)
λ(T ) = 0.
The solution of the above Cauchy problem is given by
λ?(t) =
ah
r + b(a− 1) [e
(r+b(a−1))T+(1−a)bt − ert].
Finally, we can find the exact expression of optimal unemployment rate substituting the
above value of λ? in u?
u?(t) =
hk
2(r + b(a− 1))
(
r − b+ abe(r+b(a−1))(T−t)
)
,
that is a decreasing function of t, ∂u
?
∂t < 0 for every t, and that assume value u
?(T ) =
hk/2 > 0. So, the optimal unemployment rate is always positive.
The second example is the problem of a firm that wants to expand his capacity.
Example 1.2. We are in the Eisner-Strotz model, who analyses the problem of a firm
that wants expand the machinery used for production processes in a fixed period [0, T ],
where T > 0. Assuming that the plant size is directly correlated to the capital stock K,
we call pi = pi(K) the profit rate function associated with each plant size. To realize the
expansion, the firm has to face a cost C, that’s a function of the velocity of the increment
of capital K˙. The capital stock K satisfies the differential equation K˙(t) = I(t), where
I(t) represent the net investment and it is the control variable. Thus, the optimal control
problem can be written
max
I
∫ T
0
[pi(K(t))− C(I(t))]e−ρtdt,
where K is solution of the controlled system

K˙(t) = I(t)
K(0) = K0.
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We assume that ρ,K0 > 0 and I : [0, T ] → R. In order to find the solution of the
problem we need to give an expression for pi(K) and C(I), thus we assume
pi(K) = αK − βK2 and C(I) = aI2 + bI,
where α, β, a, b are given positive costants. Then, the pre-Hamiltonian for this problem
is given by
H(t,K, I, λ) = αK − βK2 − aI2 − bI + λI.
The research of maximum value of H, respect to the control variable I, leads us to
I?(t) =
λ? − b
2a
,
where the costate λ? is a solution of the Hamiltonian system

λ˙(t) = −α+ 2βK(t) + ρλ(t), λ(T ) = 0
K˙(t) = λ
?−b
2a , K(0) = K0.
Solving the Hamiltonian system, we can easily find the optimal path for capital stock K?:
K?(t) = c1e
r1t + c2e
r2t + K¯,
where 
K¯ = α−ρb2β ,
r1 =
ρa+
√
ρ2a2+4aβ
2a , r2 =
ρa−
√
ρ2a2+4aβ
2a
c1 =
(K0−K¯)r2er2T+b/2a
r2er2T−r1er1T , c2 = −
(K0−K¯)r1er1T+b/2a
r2er2T−r1er1T .
1.1.2 Dynamic Programming
Sometimes, in Mathematics, try to solve directly a problem could be not the easier way
to face it. Embedding it in a larger class of problems and solve this one, could be a
better method to work. Basically, this is what Dynamic Programming does for optimal
control problems. So, we now consider the controlled dynamics
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
γ˙(s) = f(s, γ(s), u(s)) (0 < s < T )
γ(0) = x0.
in which γ(·) is the state variable, with γ ∈ [C1? ([0, T ];Rn) : γ(0) = x0 ∈ Rn], u : [0, T ]→
U ⊂ Rn is the control variable, with U let a closed subset of Rn and f : [0, T ]×Rn×U →
R, which respects the conditions (1.2).
We consider also the associated payoff functional J
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(γ(s), u(s))ds+ φ(γ(T ))
in which L : [0, T ] × Rn × U → R and φ : Rn → R are continuos and bounded from
below functions. What we do in Dynamic Programming is to consider a larger class of
problems, obtained by letting vary the starting times and the starting points:

γ˙(s) = f(s, γ(s), u(s)) (t < s < T )
γ(t) = x,
(1.8)
with
Jt,x(u(·)) =
∫ T
t
L(γ(s), u(s))ds+ φ(γ(T )), (1.9)
where U ⊂ Rm is a closed set, u(·) ∈ C?([s, T ], U), L and φ are continuos and bounded
from below functions and f satisfying (1.2). The Pontryagin Minimum Principle gives
us a necessary condition for an optimal solution. In the case of unique solution, we are
able to determine the optimal trajectory and the optimal control. Moreover, we find
open loop controls, that is for every initial state we find u = u(t).
With Dynamic Programming approach we are able to obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for optimality. The difference is that now we get controls u = u(t, x), called
closed loop (or feedback) controls. A closed loop is a control which depends not only on
the initial state of the system, but on the state of the system in the whole time interval.
In that sense, we can say that the controls receive a feedback from the system. So, we
have that u = u(t, x) solve the closed loop equation

γ˙(t) = f(t, γ(t), u(t, γ(t)))
γ(s) = x
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and the related minimization problem (1.9) for any initial state. The control function
u = u(t, x) is called closed loop control or feedback control.
So, we need a method to solve the problem (1.9) for all the choices of starting times
0 ≤ t ≤ T and all the initial points x ∈ Rn. First we have to define the value function
associated to the problem.
Definition 1.4. Let x ∈ Rn and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , v : [0, T ]× Rn → R is the function defined
as:
v(t, x) = inf
u(·)∈U
Jt,x(u(·)) (x ∈ Rn, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ), (1.10)
it is called the value function and represents the lowest payoff value if we start at x ∈ Rn
at time t. Note that v(T, x) = φ(x).
The method of Dynamic Programming is due to the work of Richard E. Bellman, in the
middle of twentieth century and the theorem for optimality bears his name.
Theorem 1.5 (Bellman’s Optimality Principle). Let L : [0, T ] × Rn × U → R and
φ : Rn → R continuos and bounded from below functions, and f : [0, T ]× Rn × U → R,
which respects the conditions (1.2), than the following statements hold true
1. For any fixed (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn and any u ∈ C?([0, T ], U)
v(s, x) ≤
∫ r
s
L(t, γ?u(t), u(t))dt+ v(r, γ
?
u(r)) ∀r ∈ [s, T ]
2. u?(·) is optimal if and only if
v(s, x) =
∫ r
s
L(t, γ?u?(t), u
?(t))dt+ v(r, γ?u?(r)) ∀r ∈ [s, T ]. (1.11)
Now, we want to connect the Bellman Principle to the Hamilton equation. So from the
theorem 1.5, we have
v(t, γ(t)) = inf
u
[∫ s
t
L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ + v(s, γ(s))
]
.
If we take s = t+ h we can rewrite the last equation as follows:
v(t, γ(t)) = inf
u
[∫ t+h
t
L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ + v(t+ h, γ(t+ h))
]
.
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We assume that the function v is differentiable in (t, x), then
v(t+ h, γ(t+ h)) =
= v(t, γ(t)︸︷︷︸
=x
+vt(t, γ(t))h+∇v(t, γ(t))(γ(t+ h)− γ(t)) + o(h) + o(γ(t+ h)− γ(t)).︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤c|h|
So, we can write
v(t, x) = inf
u
[∫ t+h
t
L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ+v(t, x)+vt(t, x)h+∇v(t, x)(γ(t+h)−γ(t))+o(h)
]
.
We can take v(t, x) outside the inf, so what we have is
0 = inf
u
[∫ t+h
t
L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ + vt(t, x)h+∇v(t, x)(γ(t+ h)− γ(t)) + o(h)
]
.
Now, we divide all the members of the equation for h:
0 = inf
u
[
1
h
∫ t+h
t
L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ + vt(t, x) +∇v(t, x)(γ(t+ h)− γ(t))
h
+ o(h)
]
,
from which we have that, when h→ 0:
• γ(t+h)−γ(t)h
h→0−−−→ γ˙(t) = f(t, γ(t), u(t)),
• 1h
∫ t+h
t L(ξ, γ(ξ), u(ξ))dξ
h→0−−−→ L(t, γ(t), u(t)).
Formally, when h→ 0, then v(t, x) satisfies
vt(t, x) + inf
u
[L(t, x, u) +∇v(t, x) · f(t, x, u)] = 0.
If we define the Hamiltonian H, as follows:
H(t, x, q) := inf
u∈U
[q · f(t, x, u) + L(t, x, u)],
then we can say that v(t, x) solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:

vt(t, x) +H(t, x,∇v(t, x)) = 0
v(T, x) = φ(γ(T )) = φ(x), t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn,
(1.12)
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where
vt(t, x) =
∂v(t, x)
∂t
, ∇v(t, x) =
(
∂v(t, x)
∂xi
)
1≤i≤h
.
The method of Dynamic Programming works in two steps to determine an optimal
feedback control u?(·).
Step one is related to solve the HJB equation and find the value function v.
Step two consists in the use of the value function v and the HJB partial differential
equation to design an optimal control u?(·), as follows. First of all define for each point
x ∈ Rn and for each time 0 ≤ t ≤ T a parameter value
u(t, x) = a ∈ U,
where the minimum in HJB is attained. In other word, we select u(t, x) such that
vt(t, x) + L(t, x, u(t, x)) +∇v(t, x) · f(t, x, u(t, x)) = 0.
After that, we solve the controlled system

γ˙?(s) = f(s, γ?(s), u(s, γ?(s)) (t ≤ s ≤ T )
γ(t) = x.
Finally, we can define the feedback control
u?(s) := u(s, γ?(s)). (1.13)
To conclude, we show that the feedback control defined in (1.13) is optimal, in the sense
that
Jt,x(u
?(·)) = inf
u
Jt,x(u(·)).
By the definition of the functional J , we have that
Jt,x(u
?(·)) =
∫ T
t
L(s, γ?(s), u?(s))ds+ φ(γ?(T )).
To prove the optimality of u?(·), we just need of the expressions of HJB equation (1.12)
and of the feedback control (1.13).
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So, we can write
Jt,x(u
?(·)) =
∫ T
t
(−vt(s, γ?(s))− f(γ?(s), u?(s)) · ∇xv(s, γ?(s)))ds+ φ(γ?(T ))
=−
∫ T
t
(vt(s, γ
?(s)) +∇xv(s, γ?(s)) · γ˙?(s))ds+ φ(γ?(T ))
=−
∫ T
t
∂
∂s
v(s, γ?(s))ds+ φ(γ?(T ))
=− v(T, γ?(T )) + v(t, γ?(t)) + φ(γ?(T ))
=− φ(γ?(T )) + v(t, γ?(t)) + φ(γ?(T ))
=v(t, γ) = inf
u(·)
Jt,x(u(·)).
That’s to say
Jt,x(u
?(·)) = inf
u(·)
Jt,x(u(·)),
and then u?(·) is an optimal control.
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1.2 Game Theory: An Introduction
In this section we provide an introduction to basic concepts of Game Theory.
In neo-classical theory the fundamental theorems of welfare Economics gives, in the con-
text of walrasian paradigm a formalization of Adam Smith’s invisible hand. That’s to
say that if some institutional conditions are verified, than individuals that follow their
own interest tend to an efficient allocation of resources. Nevertheless, in almost all social
interactions the axioms of fundamental theorems are not verified, because the social pay-
off depends on the structure of social relationships: beliefs, preferences of individuals,
the laws who transform actions in payoffs, etc.
The problem is that the walrasian paradigm provides a minimal representation of in-
stitutions, so it’s not a useful method to analyze the coordination problems, that are
classical issues in Economics. Garret Hardin [Har68], in a famous article make an
examples about a group of sheperds who exploit a common until it become ruined. To
describe this situation he coined the phrase tragedy of the commons, which become a
classic metaphor. Hardin said that the tragedy of the commons is the refusal of the in-
visible hand. So, if an invisible hand leads the social interaction, then individual choices
and social optimum are both achieved. But in situation like the tragedy of the com-
mons, the private interest leads to bad consequences for individuals and public goods.
The tragedy of the commons goes beyond bucolic, and it’s applicable to a large class of
economic problems. For this reason, since the middle of the last century, Game Theory
became a powerful instrument to model these situations (a really good introduction in
[Bow06]).
Game Theory is a branch of Applied Mathematics who develop models of strategical in-
teractions. With strategical interactions we mean all the situations in which the actions
who people (that we call players) make are dependent on the actions of other people,
and everyone knows it.
We can make some classical distinction in Game Theory. The first is between coopera-
tive and non-cooperative games. Cooperative game theory studies negotiations among
rational agents who can make binding agreements about how to play the game. Now
the emphasis is on the groups or coalitions of the players. The scope is to establish
which coalition will form and how the agents will share the benefit that the coalition
has, according to some ideas of fairness given by a set of desirable properties for the
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solution (axioms). In non-cooperative games the emphasis is mainly on the individual
behavior: agents cannot commit themselves and perceive self-interest looking for their
actions in order to achieve the most likely outcome of the game according to the rules
of the game. Sometimes pre-play communication between agents is allowed, but in a
non-cooperative game they are not able to make agreements except for those which are
established by the rules of the game. Of course, the division in cooperative and non-
cooperative games may not be so clear, and we can have games who present elements
of both kinds (like really are our models, examples of partial cooperative games are in
[MT08], [MT09], [CGL11]). For a complete discussion about Game Theory see [FT91],
[Mou86] and [Owe95].
In the following we show the main properties of non-cooperative games.
The first element which characterize a non-cooperative games are players. With this term
we describe the agents, that could be individual or a set of individuals, who compete in
the game.
The second element are strategies, which are all the choices available to a player. In a
given situation, any player knows a set of actions from which he must choose a single
element. The decisions made by the players may depend on the information available to
each player. If the players act only once and indipendentely of each other, than we are
considering static games. If at least one of the player is allowed to use a strategy that
depends on previous actions, than we are considering dynamic games.
The third element are payoff functions, that are real valued functions defined on the
cartesian product of the strategy spaces measuring desirability of the possible outcomes
of the game, e.g. the amounts of money the players may win or loose. Any decision
maker chooses the best action according to his preferences, represented by his payoff
function, among all the actions available to him (theory of rational choice). The players
cannot communicate before acting and usually we assume that all the players know
the structure of the game, and know that their opponents know it, and know that
their opponents know that they know and so on (the structure of the game is common
knowledge). Than, we can give a definition of a non-cooperative game, denoted by G,
in normal form as follows
Definition 1.6 (non-cooperative game). A game G is a triple:
G = (I, Si, wi),
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where I = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Si is the strategy space and wi is the payoff
function of player i.
We call strategy profile a vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), and we denote with wi(s) the payoff
for a player i associated with the strategy profile s.
Than, the combined strategy space S is the cartesian product of all the strategy set
Si: S = ×iSi; and the combined payoff function w : S → Rn is given by: w(s) =
(w1(s), w2(s), . . . , wn(s)). The extensive form representation gives a more complete in-
formation of the game and of its rules than the normal one (e.g., the sequence of moves),
thus should be good norm use it when possible. However, for our models there is not
a significant difference of information between the two representations, so we use the
normal form for its parsimony. Two classical examples in Game Theory are the prisoner
dilemma and the battle of sexes.
Example 1.3 (Prisoner dilemma). Two suspects are arrested by the police. The police
have insufficient evidence for a conviction and, having separated both prisoners, visit
each of them to offer the same deal: if one testifies (”defects”) for the prosecution against
the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice
receives the full 30 year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sentenced
to only 2 year in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a 8
year sentence. Each prisoner must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to
remain silent. The situation can be modeled as a two-person finite game G = (I, Si, wi),
where I = {1, 2}, the strategy set is Si = {NC,C}, common to both players, where the
choice C means confess and the payoffs represent the years sentence as in table 1.1.
Each player wants to minimize his own payoff.
Table 1.1: Prisoner dilemma game matrix
C NC
C 8,8 0,30
NC 30,0 2, 2
Example 1.4 (Battle of the sexes). A husband and wife wish to go out together rather
than separately and they select among the opera (O) and the stadium (S). While the wife
(player 1) prefers O, the husband (player 2) prefers S. The payoff represent how much
they prefer the choice. Players in this game are payoff maximizing. The situation can
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be modeled as a two-person finite game G = (I, Si, wi), where I = {1, 2}, the strategy
set is Si = {O,S}, common to both players, and the payoffs are given by
Table 1.2: Battle of sexes game matrix
O S
O 2,1 0,0
S 0,0 1, 2
In order to give a concept for equilibrium, we need to introduce the concept of best
replies. Denote with s−i a strategy profile that includes the strategies of all players less
than the player i: s−i = (s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). So, a best reply for a player i, to
a strategy profile s ∈ S, is a strategy si ∈ Si such that no other strategy that player i
can choose, gives him an higher payoff against s. The set of best replies to a strategy
profile s ∈ S, is a correspondence βi : S → Si which maps each strategy profile s ∈ S to
a nonempty set
βi(s) = {h ∈ Si : wi(si, s−i) ≥ wi(hi, s−i) ∀hi ∈ Si}.
We can define the combined best reply correspondences, β : S → S, as follows
β(s) = ×i∈Iβi(s).
We are now able to introduce a fundamental concept in Game Theory, the notion of
Nash equilibrium ([Nas50b], [Nas50a] and [Nas51]).
Definition 1.7 (Nash equilibrium). s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if s ∈ β(s).
Thus, in terms of best replies, a strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if it is a best
reply to itself, that’s to say if s is a fixed point of the strategy best reply correspondende
β.
Not all games has a Nash equilibrium. So, we want introduce a theorem which give some
conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium in games with infinite strategy space.
Theorem 1.8 (Existence of Nash equilibrium). Consider a game in normal form, where
a player i has a strategy space Si that is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of an
Euclidean space. If the payoff functions wi are continuos in strategy profiles s and quasi
concave in a pure strategies si, than there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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For a proof of the previous theorem see [FT91].
Let us introduce now a concept well known in International Environmental Agreements
literature: the partial cooperative equilibrium.
Let G = (I, Si, wi) be an n-player normal form game, where I = {1, 2, ..., n} (n ∈ N )
is the players set. For each player i ∈ I we have the strategy space Si and the payoff
function wi : S → R, being S = ×iSi. We denote by si,j the vector (si, si+1, . . . , sj−1, sj)
and by Si,j the cartesian product Si×Si+1× · · · ×Sj−1×Sj for any i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} and
i < j. Here we do not precise any assumption on the strategy sets S1, . . . , Sn as well
as on the payoff functions w1, . . . , wn. We assume the existence of a partial cooperative
equilibrium (for existence results see [MT09] and [CGL11]). Suppose that a set C of k
players participate in an agreement, C = {1, . . . , k} ⊂ I, while the other (n− k) players
act non-cooperatively. The number k is called the level of cooperation and we assume
that is given.
Cooperators make their choices maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition mem-
bers, i.e.
Wk(s1, . . . , sn) =
k∑
j=1
wj(s1, . . . , sn). (1.14)
The non-signatories play as singletons and choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium
with payoffs wk+1, . . . , wn. In the case k = 0 we lie in a non-cooperative game, while if
k = n we are in the case of full cooperation.
We make the Nash-Cournot assumption, so all players choose their strategy simultane-
ously, taking into account the optimality of the other players as in the Nash equilib-
rium concept. Given the level of cooperation k, the signatories choose their strategy
(y1, y2, . . . , yk) = y1,k ∈ S1,k and the following (n − k) players with payoffs wi, i =
k + 1, . . . , n, do not participate to the agreement and play as singletons, all the players
deciding together. More precisely, we look for a vector sNC(k)= (s¯1,k, s¯k+1, . . . , s¯n) ∈S
such that for any i = k + 1, . . . , n
wi(s¯1, . . . , s¯n) = max
y∈Si
wi(s¯1,k, s¯k+1, s¯i−1, y, s¯i+1, . . . , s¯n)
and also
Wk(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) = max
y1,k∈S1,k
Wk(y1,k, s¯k+1, . . . , s¯n) =
max
y1,k∈S1,k
k∑
i=1
wi(y1,k, s¯k+1, . . . , s¯n)
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where Wk is defined in (1.14).
Definition 1.9 (Partial cooperative equilibrium). A vector sNC(k)= (s¯1,k, s¯k+1, . . . , s¯n) ∈
S satisfying the above Nash equilibrium requirements is called a partial cooperative equi-
librium under the Nash-Cournot assumption of the game G where k players sign the
agreement. The value Wk(s
NC(k)) is called the aggregate welfare of the signatories
under the Nash-Cournot assumption and level of cooperation k.
Examples of partial cooperative games are in [BCK00], [MT08], [EF06], [DG08] and
[MT12].
1.2.1 Dynamic Games
In this part we introduce dynamic games (for a complete discussion see [Lon10], [BO99]
and [JZ99].)
We extend a game over a time horizon, that could be both finite or infinite. If the game
is continuously time-dependent, we call it differential game. The time dependence of
these games, brings some additional properties compared to static games. First of all,
the overall payoffs for players are the sum (or integral) of the discounted payoffs over the
time horizon. Moreover, the value of the payoff depends both on the actions of players
and on the state of the system, which is represented by one or plus state variable.
In turn, the state of the system depends on the actions of the players, that we represent
with control variables. Finally, the rate of change of a state variable is described by
a difference or a differential equation. We consider dynamic games in the dynamic
optimization framework. So, we define a N -player differential game as follows
Definition 1.10 (N-player differential game). A N-player differential game of pre spec-
ified fixed duration, involves the following
1. A set I of players, I = {1, . . . , N}.
2. A time interval [0, T ], which is specified a priori and denotes the duration of the
game.
3. An infinite set S with some topological structure, called the trajectory space of
the game. Its elements γ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , represent the possible state trajectories of
the game. For each fixed t ∈ [0, T ], γ(t) ∈ S0, where S0 is a subset of Rn.
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4. An infinite set U with some topological structure that we define control space,
whose elements u(t) are called control functions.
5. A differential equation
γ˙(t) = f(t, γ, u), γ(0) = γ0,
which describes the state trajectory of the game for a control u and a given initial
state γ0.
6. A payoff function, correlated with a functional J(·)
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(s, γ, u)ds+ φ(γ(T )).
It’s always possible to consider a non-cooperative game as an optimization problem,
than finding the stationary points of a given problem is equivalent to find fixed points
in best reply correspondence of the game (for a proof see [Fin01]). Consider a game
in which players can control the state of a given system, described by the trajectory
function γ(t), through a control function u(t). That’s, γ(·) solves the dynamical system
γ˙(t) = f(t, γ, u), γ(0) = γ0.
To find the Nash equilibrium of that game, we need to introduce a payoff functional
J(·), as follows
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(s, γ, u)ds+ φ(γ(T )).
Than, suppose that U ⊂ Rn is a closed set, f ∈ C([0, T ]×Rn×U) satisfies the conditions
(1.2) and that L : [0, T ]×Rn×U → R and φ : Rn → R are continuos and bounded from
below functions. Finding the Nash equilibrium of a differential game, is equivalent to
solve the Optimal Control problem
inf
u(·)
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(t, xx0(t), u(t))dt+ φT (x
x0(T )),
where u ∈ C?([0, T ], U) and xx0(·, u) ∈ C1? ([0, T ],Rn) is a solution of
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t))
x(0) = x0.
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From Dynamic Optimization theory, we have two possible approaches to that kind of
problem, than we have two kinds of strategies and controls. We distinguish between
open-loop strategies and Markov-perfect strategies (or feedback strategies). The first
ones, are available when a player can make a credible pre-commitment, so an open-loop
strategy is a planned time path of actions chosen by a player. That follows, a open-loop
Nash equilibrium (OLNE) is a profile of open-loop strategies, such that each player’s
open-loop strategy maximizes its payoff, given the open-loop strategies of other players.
OLNEs are time consistent, but not robust to perturbations: that’s to say, along the
equilibrium path, no one as an incentive to deviate, but if someone do this (also for an
error), than it will be no optimal for other players to continue on original plan. Clearly,
the credibility of the commitment is a focus point in open-loop strategies: each player
can be suspicious about the real intentions of the other players, and the moral hazard
problem rises.
On the other side, a Markov-perfect strategy is a rule that governs actions at any date
on the observation of the state variables at that date. Consequently, a Markov-perfect
Nash equilibrium (MPNE) is a profile of Markov-perfect strategies, such that for every
couple (t, γ(t)), where t represent time and γ(t) the state of the system at time t, the
objective function of every player is maximized, given the Markov-perfect strategies of
the other players. So, if agents use a path strategy, they make a binding commitment at
the starting point about the actions they will take in the rest of the game. Otherwise, if
they use a decision rule, the actions at any date t, will be a consequence of the observed
state of the system at that date. Nevertheless, a Nash equilibrium in decision rules case,
is not necessary a MPNE. To be Markov-perfect it must satisfy the condition that the
continuation of the given decision rules is also a Nash equilibrium when viewed by any
future (t, γ(t)) pair. The search for a MPNE seems to be a better way forward than a
OLNE, and in facts is the most used method. The issue, however, is not so easy to deal
with. The dependence of the equilibrium by the state of the system in every time, don’t
eliminates the moral hazard, to the extent that a player can manipulate the actions of
the others, influencing the state variables. Thus, MPNE could be a better concept for
equilibrium if we assume that players are sophisticated and manipulative. On the other
side, for a several kind of games, the OLNE gives an higher payoff to players than the
MPNE. So, if players have the ability to commit, an agreements to play the open-loop
strategy could be incentivized. Moreover, an OLNE is easier to compute than MPNE,
and this could be a great advantage, especially in such game in which Markov-perfect
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strategies gives a small gain in sophistication. In the end, the choice between OLNE
and MPNE is based on the assumption about the ability to pre-commit. In the first,
players pre-commit the whole time path of actions, in the latter players are not able to
pre-commit at all. Clearly, there are middle ways, so in some cases players are able to
pre-commit in the short run, but not in the long run (see [RS85]).
Applications to Economics are in several fields of the discipline, like management science
(see e.g., [JMZ10], [BG12], [VZ09]), environmental protection (see e.g., [RC05], [RU07],
[BL98]), or industrial organization (see e.g., [FK87] and [JV04]). Let us conclude this
section with a game proposed in [Lon92], about transboundary pollution in infinite time
horizon.
Example 1.5. Consider a world with only two countries. For each country i, we denote
with yi(t) the output at time t and we assume that output is proportional, with factor
normalized at one, at the emission Ei(t), than Ei(t) = yi(t) ∀t.
The stock of pollutant at time t, common to both countries, is denoted by S(t) and follows
the differential equation
S˙(t) = E1(t) + E2(t)− δS(t), (1.15)
where δ > 0 is the natural rate of decay. Moreover, we assume both quadratic functions,
for utility, Bi(t), and for damage, Di(S(t))
Bi(t) = aiyi(t)− 12(yi(t))2,
Di(t) =
ci
2 (S(t))
2,
where ai and ci are stritcly positive parameters.
So, every country objective is maximize their own social welfare, wi, subject to equation
(1.15)
wi =
∫ ∞
0
[Bi(t)−Di(S(t))]e−ρtdt,
where ρ > 0 is the rate of discount.
Let us begin with the research of the OLNE.
Assume that country i believes that the other country j plays an open-loop strategy
Ej(t) = K
OL
j (t), so the maximization problem is
max
Ei(·)
∫ ∞
0
[
aiEi(t)− 1
2
(Ei(t))
2 − ci
2
(S(t))2
]
e−ρtdt, (1.16)
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subject to
S˙(t) = Ei(t) +K
OL
j (t)− δS(t), S(0) = S0.
This is an optimal control problem, and we can use the Maximum Principle to solve it.
So, consider the Hamiltonian function of the problem, Hi
Hi = aiEi − 1
2
(Ei)
2 − ci
2
(S)2 + pi(Ei +K
OL
j − δS),
where pi is the costate variable. For Pontryagin Principle, we have three necessary
conditions, that are
∂Hi
∂Ei
= ai − Ei + pi = 0, (1.17)
−(p˙i − ρpi) = ∂Hi
∂S
= −ciS − piδ, (1.18)
S˙ =
∂Hi
∂pi
= Ei +K
OL
j − δS, (1.19)
with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtpi(t)S(t) = 0. (1.20)
We can rearrenge (1.17) respect pi and reduce the system by this way
−(E˙i − ρ(Ei − ai)) = −ciS − δ(Ei − ai),
S˙ = Ei +K
OL
j − δS, S(0) = S0,
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt(Ei(t)− ai)S(t) = 0.
Clearly, for player j we have a similar set of equations. The point is: to find an OLNE,
we must find a couple of open-loop strategies (KOL1 ,K
OL
2 ), such that K
OL
1 (t) = E
?
1(t)
and KOL2 (t) = E
?
2(t), where (E
?
1 , E
?
2 , S
?) solve the three differential equations
E˙1(t) = c1S(t) + (ρ+ δ)(E1(t)− a1),
E˙2(t) = c2S(t) + (ρ+ δ)(E2(t)− a2),
S˙(t) = E1(t) + E2(t)− δSt, S(0) = S0,
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with the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt(E1(t)− a1)S(t) = 0,
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt(E2(t)− a2)S(t) = 0.
The solution of the system (E?1 , E
?
2 , S
?) is unique and converges to a unique steady state
(Eˆ1, Eˆ2, Sˆ), as follows

Eˆ1
Eˆ2
Sˆ
 = 1det J

−a1δ(ρ+ δ)2 − a1c2(ρ+ δ) + a2c1(ρ+ δ)
−a2δ(ρ+ δ)2 − a2c1(ρ+ δ) + a1c2(ρ+ δ)
−(a1 + a2)(ρ+ δ)2
 ,
where J is the Jacobian matrix 
ρ+ δ 0 c1
0 ρ+ δ c2
1 1 −δ
 .
Finally, we consider the case of Markov-perfect strategies.
The difference respect the open-loop strategies, is that the country i assumes now that
country j uses a feedback emissions strategy Ej(t) = K
FB
j (S(t)). Thus, the optimal
control problem is now
max
Ei(·)
∫ ∞
0
[
aiEi(t)− 1
2
(Ei(t))
2 − ci
2
(S(t))2
]
e−ρtdt, (1.21)
subject to
S˙(t) = Ei(t) +K
FB
j (S(t))− δS(t), S(0) = S0.
To solve the problem, the most useful method is dynamic programming. So, called vi(·)
the value function of player i, we have the HJB equation
ρvi(S) = max
Ei
[
aiEi − 1
2
(Ei)
2 − ci
2
(S)2 + v′i(S)(Ei + Ej(S)− δS)
]
. (1.22)
Moreover, we impose that v don’t increase too fast along the equilibrium path:
lim
t→∞ e
ρtv(S(t)) = 0.
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The first order condition of equation (1.22) gives us an expression for Ei(S):
Ei(S) = ai + v
′
i(S).
To simplify the calculation, we assume that the two countries are symmetric, so they
have the same parameters: ai = aj = a and ci = cj = c. As a consequence we have
v′i(S) = v
′
j(S) = v
′(S), than Ei(S) = Ej(S) = E(S).
Substituting inside (1.22), we obtain
ρv(S) =
1
2
[a2 + 4av′ + 3(v′)2]− δSv′ − c
2
S2. (1.23)
Let us use a quadratic guess for value function:
v(S) = −αS
2
2
− βS − µ,
so, the emission function become
E(S) = a− β − αS.
In order to determine the parameters α, β and µ, we substitute the expression of v(S)
and v′(S) inside (1.23). What we found is a quadratic equation in S, of the form
p0 + p1S + p2S
2.
Since this expression must hold for all S, parameters must satisfy the conditions
p0 = 0, p1 = 0, p2 = 0
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From these three conditions we can derive the parameters we need
α =
1
3
[
−
(
δ +
ρ
2
)
+
√(
δ +
ρ
2
)2
+ 3c
]
,
β =
2aα
ρ+ δ + 3α
,
µ =
a− β
2ρ
(3α− δ − ρ).
Finally, we have that S converge to the steady state
SˆM =
2a(δ + ρ+ α)
(δ + ρ+ 2α)(2α+ δ)
.
With some algebra, it’s easy to determine that Sˆ < SˆM , and that the initial emission
under the MPNE is also higher than that under the OLNE.
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1.3 International Environmental Agreements
The last example is a problem of transboundary pollution control. We consider only two
countries and we show only the case of non-cooperative solutions, that’s, each player
maximize his own welfare, which is given by the difference between benefit from each
player’s emissions and the damage-cost due to global emission2. But, the global nature
of the problem, obviously leads us to think about what happens if the countries con-
cerned cooperate.
International Environmental Agreements are a great issue for politicians and economists
in the last three decades. One of the first examples is the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, in 1987. The protocol is an international treaty
designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of numerous sub-
stances that are responsible for ozone depletion, like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hy-
drochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The agreement has
undergone eight revisions: London (1990), Nairobi (1991), Copenaghen (1992), Bangkok
(1993), Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997), Beijing (1999) and Montreal (2007), and has
been ratified by 197 countries. Another important agreement is the Kyoto Protocol,
signed in the Japanese city of Kyoto in 1997. The treaty, which have seen some im-
portant defection during the years, commits State Parties to reduce Green House Gases
(GHGs) emissions, with the objective to contain the global warming. To do this, the
treaty created a market in which countries can exchange the right to emit.
So, if we assume at least two of the countries can join in a coalition, than the determi-
nation of Nash equilibrium is only a part of the problem. In fact, now, another critical
point is: how can it be built a stable coalition? In a non-cooperative approach, there’s
not a supranational authority that can force countries to cooperate, so the focus is on
mechanism design of the agreement. These games, both static and dynamic, are two
stage games: in the first stage, called membership game, players decide whether join or
not in coaltion, while in the second one, called emission game, players establish their
emissions, maximizing the joint welfare if they are in coalition or their single welfare if
they stay outside.
It’s clear that in non-cooperative context, the well known problem of free-riding is in-
evitable. In the case of common resources, a free-rider is a player who can benefits from
these resources without pay for them. So, when we think to membership game we need
2For a discussion about this kind of aggregative games see [MT09].
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to define some conditions to disincentive the free-riders.
The conditions commonly used in literature are those developed in [dAs+83], in which
some conditions for a self-enforcing agreement are defined in the case of a cartel. Con-
sider a n-player game, and assume that k join in a coalition and the other (n − k) act
non-cooperatively. We denote with wi(k) the welfare of i-th player when the coalition is
formed by k player. The first condition is called internal stability condition: a coalition
is stable if its dimension k is such that for every player i inside the coalition holds
wCi (k) ≥ wNCi (k − 1), (1.24)
where C denote cooperative welfare and NC denote the non-cooperative one. This
condition can be interpreted as follows: k is the dimension of a stable coalition if the
welfare of a cooperative player when coalition is formed by k players is at least equal to
its non-cooperative welfare when coalition is formed by (k− 1) players. In other word a
coalition is internally stable if there is not a player inside who has an incentive to defect.
The second condition is called external stability condition: for every player j outside
coalition, k must verify
wNCj (k) ≥ wCj (k + 1). (1.25)
That’s to say, no one of the (n− k) players outside coalition as an incentive to join the
agreement. Of course, these condition are the most used in literature, but are not the
only: for a different approach to the stability problem see [Fin03] and [EF06].
There is a very extensive literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs),
that starts in early nineties with the static models proposed by Carraro and Siniscalco
(see [CS93]) and Barrett (see [Bar94]). A brief analysis of these models allow us to show
some general issues on IEAs problem.
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) [CS93]. They consider a world with n symmetric
countries (n ≥ 2), where each country benefits from using the environment as a factor
of production and as a receptacle of emissions. Nevertheless, this exploitation of natural
resources generate a damage, via emissions. If we denote with xi the emissions of country
i, and with x−i the vector of emissions of the other (n− 1) countries, we can represent
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the welfare Pi(x) of country i as follows
Pi(x) = fi(xi)−Di(xi, x−i),
where fi(xi) is the benefit function, Di(xi, x−i) is the damage function and x = (xi, x−i).
The benefit function is related to the use of environment for production and consump-
tion, and depends on abatement costs, that’s to say that depends on the level of technolo-
gies, on the economic structure, on the general level of development and the endowment
of resources of a country 3. Inside the word technology, there are not only the indus-
trial processes who turn inputs in outputs, but we mean also the useful knowledge and
experience, institutions, organizational structure, norms and values who govern the pro-
duction processes. On the other side, the damage function Di(xi, x−i) depends on the
perception that country i has about the negative effects of emissions of pollutant and on
the evaluation of such effects. Then, the damage function is a subjective evaluation of
environmental goods. These games are two stage games: really the membership game is
a metagame, because of each player choosing whether join or not in coalition, anticipates
the choice of the other players and the relative outcomes in terms of emission levels. So,
the solution of emission game is clear: non-cooperative players maximize their own wel-
fare, that’s to say that they choose the emission corresponding to a fixed point in best
reply function, while cooperators choose the emissions that maximize the joint welfare.
The point is: what is the solution of membership game?
The dimension of a stable coalition is the integer number k, who verifies the inequalities
(1.24) and (1.25). But, assume that the grand coalition, that is when all players join
the agreement, is the social optimum. Then, the real question is: how can we design the
agreements to have a stable coalition with k = n players?
Carraro and Siniscalco show that in a static context with symmetric player the envi-
ronment problem not necessary leads to the tragedy of commons. Indeed, there is a
range of possible voluntary cooperators, who join in a profitable and stable agreement
for pollution control. Moreover, it’s possible to expand the size of the coalition if mem-
bers decide to transfer the gains of cooperation to non-members. Nevertheless, the only
forecast of a transfer scheme is not enough to sustain a large coalition, that require a
certain degree of commitment by the players.
Barrett’s model (1994) [Bar94]. It is a game with n symmetric players, where the
3Henceforth we will use indifferently the terms benefit function and production function for fi(·).
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strategic variables are not emissions, but abatement levels. There is a duality between
the two kinds of problems, so results on cooperation level are valid in both cases (for a
discussion see [Fin01] and [DS06]). So, he consider for each player i a benefit function,
fi(·), who depends on the global abatement level, as follows
fi(Q) =
b
(
aQ− Q22
)
N
,
where a and b are positive parameters, N is the total number of players and Q =
∑N
j=1 qj
is the total abatement level, with qj is the abatement level of each player j. On the other
hand, each player i has to incur a cost for abatement, denoted by Di(·)
Di(qi) =
cq2i
2
,
where c is a positive parameter. In this context, cooperators can punish a country that
withdraws from the agreement reducing their abatement level, and the threat is credible
because of the signatories always maximize their joint welfare. Nevertheless, Barrett
shows, by numerical simulations, that this is not sufficient to have a stable and large
coalition. In fact, or a self-enforcing IEA do not exist, or it consist of no more than two
or three countries. The only way to have a coalition that is stable and large is when the
gain from cooperation respect non-cooperation close to zero. Moreover, the results are
the same considering a linear benefit function, fi(Q) = ωQ, but, in this case is possible
to produce an analytical proof. So, denote by α the fraction of players that join the
agreement, the optimal solution are
qns =
ω
c
and qs =
ωαN
c
,
where ns denote the non-signatories and s denote the signatories. In order to obtain the
stability condition we need four expressions for welfare, that are, substituting optimal
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emissions
wns(α) =
ω2N(1− α+ α2N − 12N )
c
, (1.26)
ws(α) =
ω2N(1− α+ α2N2 )
c
, (1.27)
wns(α− 1/N) = ω
2N(1− 3α+ 32N + α2N)
c
, (1.28)
ws(α+ 1/N) =
ω2N(1− 12N + α
2N
2 )
c
. (1.29)
Now, from the internal stability, given by ws(α)−wns(α− 1/N) ≥ 0, we obtain the so-
lution 1/N ≤ α ≤ 3/N . If we consider the external stability, wns(α)−ws(α+ 1/N) ≥ 0,
we found the solution α ≥ 2/N . Follows that the system is verified when αN ∈ [2, 3],
so if N = 2 we have that both countries sign the agreement, instead when N ≥ 3 the
self-enforcing agreement consists of three countries.
These two models allow us to show some critical points. First, without detracting from
the validity of the arguments, it’s clear that pollution control is in reality a dynamic
problem. Static models can give important contributions to discussion on stability IEAs,
but dynamical models give a more realistic picture of the phenomenon. Second, as we
saw, the treatment of stability is not really easy in analytical way, so, for sake of simplic-
ity, a large part of the literature consider frameworks with symmetric countries. Than,
the introduction of a certain degree of asymmetry between countries, give for sure a
contribution to descriptive power. Third, what emerges from the models, is that if
we want a stable and large coalition, if possible the grand coalition, we need to create
some mechanisms that incentive players to cooperate, or that disincentive players to non
cooperate. All these issues have been addressed in the literature, and there is a very
extensive stream of works who approach the problem in dynamic case.
In the last years various models consider a world divided at least in two kinds of players,
developed and developing countries. Clearly, the most realistic way is to consider that
each player has its own parameters, but for sake of simplicity, the division in developed
and developing countries is a good approximation of the principle factor of asymmetry.
For the last problem, several proposals to design a self-enforcing agreements, both static
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and dynamic has been presented. For example, we have models based on IEAs sup-
ported by trigger strategies, that’s to say that if a player in coalition defects, the other
cooperators can punish him. Or, as we saw with the model of Carraro and Siniscalco,
the gain from cooperation can be used, via transfer scheme, to enlarge a stable coali-
tion. Finally, we have the way known as issue linkage, that’s try to make the agreement
economically advantageous linking the IEAs to another agreement, that could be R&D,
or trade or another economic issue 4.
Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013) ([PZ13]). They consider a world with N asymmetric
countries. Each country i emits a pollutant ei, and receives a benefit from production,
defined by the function fi(·)
fi(ei) = δi
(
αiei − 1
2
e2i
)
,
where αi and δi are strictly positive parameters. On the other side, global emissions
found a damage to each player i:
Di(S) = βiS,
where βi > 0, is a parameter, and S =
∑N
j=1 ej is the global emission. As usual, we sup-
pose that k players join the agreement, while the others, (N −k), act non cooperatively.
From optimization problems we can derive the emissions, as follows
eCi = αi −
∑k
h=1 βh
δi
and eNCj = αj −
βj
δj
,
for each player i in coalition, and for each player j outside coalition. Suppose now,
that we have only two kinds of countries, than N = N1 +N2. So, players of kind 1 are
identified by parameters (α1, δ1, β1) and players of kind 2 by parameters (α2, δ2, β2). For
the analysis of stability, we can use the conditions (1.24) and (1.25) to find the maximal
size and the composition of the coalition. Clearly, in the case of asymmetric players the
stability conditions must hold both for players of kind 1 and kind 2. First, we note that
in case of symmetry the maximal size of a stable coalition is three, that’s a standard
results in literature. If we consider two kinds of countries, we can summarize the results
in the following proposition.
4for a different and interesting approach see [MRS14]
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Proposition 1.11. The maximal size of a stable coalition consists of two countries of
kind 1, and N2 countries of kind 2, provided that β :=
β1
β2 is large enough and δ :=
δ1
δ2 is
small enough.
Then, the maximal size of a stable coalition is that one composed by two players ok kind
1 and all players of kind 2, if some conditions on parameters are verified. This conditions
require that the marginal damage from pollution of players of kind 1 is greater enough
respect marginal damage of players of kind 2, while their shifting marginal benefits are
very closer.
Recently, some works have addressed the problem in a dynamical way, like [RC05],
[RU07], [Zee05], [Bah+09] and [BSZ10]. Rubio and Casino, provide a N -player differen-
tial game with symmetric countries, who are characterized by quadratic production and
damage-cost functions. The main result of this model is that, in dynamic context the
maximum size of a stable agreement is only two players, independently from the gain of
cooperation and from the use of open-loop or feedback strategies. [Bah+09] introduces
asymmetric countries, and uses the calibration from MERGE (model for evaluating re-
gional and global Green House Gases reduction) to establish in which conditions is pos-
sible to achieve the full cooperation. In [BSZ10] were considered N asymmetric players,
and that a fraction s of their join the agreement, while the rest (1− s) defects. In this
model the analysis of stability don’t deals with the self-enforcing conditions (1.24) and
(1.25), but is assumed that s follows an evolutionary dynamics based on imitation of
the best. What they found is that when punishment has a cost, it’s possible to have a
solution with no countries in coalition, along with partial or full cooperation. The final
result depends on the initial conditions: if the initial coalition is not large enough for a
given value of stock of pollutant, than the equilibrium solution is full defection. Partial
or full cooperation can be reached increasing the punishment or decreasing the cost for
punishing. In case that the punishment is without cost, full defection can’t be observed,
and the partial or full cooperation don’t depends by initial conditions, but only on the
parameters value.
We said that the stability of a large coalition depends on how the agreements are
drawn. We said, moreover, that the most used mechanisms are trigger strategies, trans-
fer schemes and issue linkage. We want to go a different way, following the idea of Social
Externality presented in [CR06].
Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2006) [CR06]. In their static model, they consider a
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world with N symmetric countries, k of which decide to choose jointly their abatement
levels, and (N − k) maximize their own welfare. The functional forms of the model
consider a linear benefit function, fi(·), and a quadratic damage-cost function, Di(·), for
each player i
fi(Q) = ωQ, Di(qi) =
cq2i
2
,
where ω and c are stritcly positive parameters, qi is the abatement level of player i
and Q =
∑N
j=1 qj is the global abatement. The assumption now, is that the welfare of
cooperators is affected by a social externality, that’s a positive function of the number
of players and not depends on abatement levels. So, if we denote with qC the optimal
abatement levels for cooperators and with qNC the optimal abatement levels for non
cooperators, than the welfare for each player i in coalition is
wC = ω(kqC + (N − k)qNC)− cq
C
2
+ sk,
where s > 0 is a parameter. On the other side, the welfare for each non cooperator is
wNC = ω(kqC + (N − k)qNC)− cq
NC
2
.
From optimization we obtain the two expressions for abatement levels
qC =
ωk
c
, qNC =
ω
c
.
By stability conditions we can determine the interval in which falls the size of the stable
coalition: k ∈ [k?− 1, k?], where k? = s˜/2 + 2 +√s˜2/4 + 2s˜+ 1 and s˜ = 2 c
ω2
s. It’s clear
that k is an increasing function of s˜, so for a suitable choice of c, ω, and s, we can have
a stable grand coalition. Let us explain our interpretation of this Social Externality.
From a mathematical point we assume that a strictly positive function, denoted by
Ext(·) is added to welfare of every cooperator, and this function depends only on the
number of players in coalition. For this reason, Ext(·) has no effects on the maximization
process. There is a stream in literature that studies the possibilities of optimality of
multiple coalition (see [Fin03]) and this issue was proposed in the lasts Conferences of
Parties (COP), so it’s also a political question. Nevertheless, we assume that the grand
coalition is the Social Optimum, that’s a classical hypothesis in literature. So, we need
to improve some mechanisms that help to obtain this final result.
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Basically, the point is to create some incentives to join or some disincentives to defect,
and we spoken about trigger strategies, transfer scheme and issue linkage. Our choice
to try a different way, rise from some practical considerations.
The first one, is that it’s now necessary involve development countries in emission’s
reduction process. There are some of this countries, like China, India, Brazil and South
Africa (that with Russia formed the so-called BRICS), that contribute significantly to
pollution. But, following the Kyoto Protocol, is very difficult to ask these countries
to implement pollution control policies. For historical reasons, because they have not
responsibility about the level of pollution and for economics reason. The fact is that
environment is a “luxury” good for these countries, because their principal issue is to
increase the wealth per capita, build infrastructure, increase the level of instruction, etc.
So, from one hand there’s that is hard to think that developing countries act for some
kind of farsightedness and, on the other side, they have too economic power to imagine
that a punishment is a credible threat or that anyone would pay for their collaboration.
The issue linkage is the closer idea to our approach, but we think that specifying one kind
of collateral agreement there is a significant loss in possible incentives. So, we introduce
in our model the concept of Social Externality, like in [CR06]. The idea is: when
players have to decide whether join the coalition or not, they consider the possibility to
earn an extra-payoff, not related to pollution control, just for the reason that joining
creates a connection with other countries. Classical example is Russia, that ratified the
Kyoto protocol with the hope to have more consideration when its entry in World Trade
Organization (WTO) would have been voted. We know that is very vague, because
potentially within this concept of externality are all the possible relations that countries
could establish, and this could bring a loss in descriptive power. On the other side, we
think that this loss it’s acceptable, consider the great flexibility that the vagueness of
the externality create for the design of the agreement. So, the purpose of this Thesis is
verify if the Social Externality could be a good mechanism to bring the grand coalition.
We consider a Global Emission Game (GEG) and a world with asymmetric countries,
where a GEG is defined as follows
GEG = {I,∆, fi(ei), Di(S), wi, S},
where I = {1, 2..., n} is a set of n asymmetric players, ∆ is the set of emission strategies,
fi(ei) is the benefit function from emissions for a player i, Di(S) is the damage-cost
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function from stock of pollutant, wi is the net benefit, given by fi −Di, S is the stock
of pollutant.
Specifically, we assume that the world is divided in two kinds of countries, developed and
developing countries, and that there is homogeneity within two groups. We deal with
three different games, one static and two differential, where a Social Externality term
is added to agent’s welfare function. In the static case the Social Externality allows to
obtain new results that generalize the work of [CR06] because we deal with asymmetric
countries.
In our work we include the concept of Social Externality in the differential context,
considering first a two player game and then extending the model to the case of N-
player game. We consider the two-player differential game on pollution control in [MZ13]
where the damage cost function takes into account a gradual involvement approach for
environmental problems of the developing country: this model is extended to a N-player
situation and adding the Social Externality effect allows to enlarge the coalition of
cooperating countries.

Chapter 2
N-player Static Game
In this Chapter we investigate the question if a Social Externality leads to a stable coali-
tion in a N -player static game, in the spirit of Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani ([CR06]).
We deal with a game with N asymmetric players by considering the membership game
and the global emission game. As usual, first we will face the emission game and find
the Nash equilibrium in a partial cooperative framework.
Thereafter, we will proceed with the membership game and find some stability condi-
tions considering a self-enforcing agreement. In order to give an analytical proof of the
existence of a stable coalition, we assume that countries are divided in two homoge-
neous groups, developed and developing countries. This assumption is in line with the
arrangement of the Kyoto Protocol, which have been provided different commitments
for developed countries and for countries in the developing.
To conclude we present some numerical results about the size and the composition of a
stable coalition. The Chapter is divided as follows: in Section 1 we present the assump-
tions of the model and its functional forms; in Section 2 we characterize the emission
solutions and the expressions of the optimal welfares; in Section 3 we show our results
about the membership game.
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2.1 The Model
In this section we present the model. We consider a world with N asymmetric countries
that correspond to our set of players I, where I = {1, ..., N}. We make some commonly
assumptions about the functional forms of the model.
Let us remind that we are modeling a global emission game, that we define in normal
form, and for a static game, as follows.
Definition 2.1. We call Global Emission Game (GEG) a normal form game
GEG = (I, S, wi),
where I = {1, 2..., N} is a set of N asymmetric players, S (S is a real interval) is the set
of emission strategies common to all players and wi is the payoff of each player i. We
denote with fi : S → R the production function of player i, where ei ∈ S describes the
emissions of the player. The idea behind is that there is a direct correlation between
production and pollution1. Moreover Di : R→ R, defined by Di(E) is the damage-cost
function for player i, where E is the global emission, E =
∑N
p=1 ep. Than, the net benefit
of player i from emissions is given by
wi(e1, . . . , eN ) = fi(ei)−Di(E),
We lie within the partial cooperative games literature ([MT08], [MT09], [CGL11] and
[BCK00]), so we assume that k players join the coalition and (N−k) players defect. Thus,
we can write the maximization problems, both for non-cooperators and cooperators, as
follows
max
ej
wj = max
ej
{fj(ej)−Dj(E)},
where wj is the welfare of a country j outside coalition. Without loss in generality, we
suppose that the first k players in the set I join the coalition, so we denote by C =
{1, . . . , k} the set of cooperators. They maximize the joint welfare and the optimization
problem is
max
e1,...,ek
k∑
i=1
wi = max
e1,...,ek
k∑
i=1
[fi(ei)−Di(E)].
1Mathematically, we assume that emissions are by-product of industrial activities xi, that’s to say
ei = g(xi). If we take g(·) as a smooth function, we can invert it and write xi = g−1(ei) := fi(ei).
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Due to the nature of the problem, we make the assumption that ei ∈ ∆ is positive for
all i ∈ I, and that the strategy set for each player i, ∆ ⊂ R, is compact.
Moreover, we make some typical assumptions on the functions that describe the model
(see [Fin01]). First, we choose a twice continuously differentiable damage-cost function
Di(E) such that: D
′
i(E) ≥ 0 and D′′i (E) ≥ 0, ∀ei ≥ 0, and Di(0) = 0. If w′′i < 0, than
f ′′i (ei) < D
′′
i (E), ∀ei ≥ 0. Finally, the production function fi(ei) is chosen such that:
f ′i(ei) ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ ei ≤ e¯i, while we don’t make assumptions on f ′i(ei) ∀ei ≥ e¯i,
and ei(0) = 0. The assumptions on the first derivatives of fi(ei), imply that there is an
emission level e¯i, before which the benefits are an increasing function, while after fi(ei)
may either continue to increase or remain constant or decrease. The choice f ′′i (ei) < 0
reflects the standard hypothesis of decreasing marginal economies of scale in the produc-
tion2. The assumptions on damage-cost function, Di(E), describe the fact that damage
increase in emissions at an increasing rate. The interpretation is that when the rate of
contamination is higher, than self-purification of environmental system is diminishing.
There might be an upper bound of global emissions, above which the system collapse,
but we assume that this level is higher than the global emissions which derive from
maximization of welfares. Another way to interpret the assumption D′′i (E) ≥ 0 is that
it could be viewed as society’s willingness to pay for emission reduction. So, when the
global emissions rise to very high levels, this willingness increase more than proportion-
ally respect emissions.
2.1.1 Functional Forms
We present in the following the functional forms of the model by choosing the production,
the damage-cost and the externality functions.
So, for each player i, we consider
fi(ei) =δi
(
αiei − 1
2
e2i
)
,
Di(ei) =βi
( N∑
i=1
ei
)
,
where, ei is the emission of player i, and the parameters αi, βi (vulnerability to environ-
mental damage) and δi (shifting marginal benefits) are strictly positive. We consider a
2Or decreasing marginal utility, if we consider emission like a consumption good.
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quadratic production function that is a classic choice in literature, and a linear damage-
cost function, that is not uncommon in literature (see e.g., [HS97], [BSZ10] and [PZ13])
and supported by some empirical estimations (see [LL03]). Nevertheless, the differences
between a linear damage-cost function and a more realistic quadratic function (see e.g.,
[MRS14], [FP13] and [McG07]) are almost all quantitative, but not qualitative.
Denoting with Exti the externality, we assume a constant contribution from each player
Exti = si,
where si is a strictly positive parameter.
Now, the k players that form the coalition maximizing the joint welfare, and the remain-
ing (N − k) players act by their own, maximizing their single welfare. So, we have the
optimization problem, for each player j not in coalition, as follows:
max
ej
wNCj = maxej
{
δj
(
αjej − 1
2
e2j
)
− βj
( n∑
i=1
ei
)}
. (2.1)
For the coalition, we have a joint welfare maximization and moreover we hypothesize that
a social externality, related only on number of players in coalition, affects the welfare.
So the optimization problem is:
max
e1...ek
k∑
i=1
wCi = maxe1...ek
k∑
i=1
[
δi
(
αiei − 1
2
e2i
)
− βi
( k∑
h=1
eh +
n∑
h=k+1
eh
)
+ si
]
. (2.2)
Definition 2.2. Any vector (e¯1, . . . , e¯N ) ∈ ∆n such that e¯i satisfies (2.1) for all i = k+
1, . . . , N and e¯i satisfies (2.2) for all i = 1, . . . , k, is called partial cooperative equilibrium.
We consider emissions as a by-product of industrial activities, and assuming that the
function that relates emissions and production are smooth and invertible, we express
the production for country i as a function of emission levels, and we indicate it with
fi(ei), being ei the emission of country i. Moreover, our hypothesis is that developed
countries have an higher degree of interest in environmental issues respect developing
countries, both for economic and historical motivations. In the end, this is the same
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approach of the Kyoto protocol. The point is: a developing country need to improve
his infrastructures, increasing per capita wealth, life expectance, instruction level, etc.
In this context, environment is a ”luxury good”. In addition, the actual level of stock
pollutant cannot be attributed to developing countries.
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2.2 Emission Solutions and Welfares
In order to find the optimal emissions for the defectors, we solve the first order conditions
of the problem (2.1). Deriving respect ej and imposing the result equal to zero, we have
∂wNCj
∂ej
= αjδj − δjej − βj = 0.
Rearranging we can find the expression for non-cooperative emissions, as follows
eNCj = αj −
βj
δj
. (2.3)
In a similar way, we calculate the partial derivative of the problem (2.2), respect ei, where
i = 1, . . . , k, and find the emission of every player in coalition solving the k-dimensional
system obtained imposing all the derivative equal to zero

α1δ1 − δ1e1 −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0,
...
αiδi − δiei −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0,
...
αkδk − δkek −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0.
Than the emission for each player i in coalition is:
eCi = αi −
1
δi
k∑
h=1
βh. (2.4)
To find the welfares of cooperative and non-cooperative players, we have to compute
wi(e
C
1 , . . . , e
C
k , e
NC
k+1, . . . , e
NC
N ) for any i ∈ I, that we denote by wCi (k) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
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and by wNCj (k) for j ∈ {k + 1, .., N}

wCi (k) = δi
[
αi
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)
− 12
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)2]
+
−βi
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
+
∑k
h=1 sh,
wNCj (k) = δj
[
αj
(
αj − βjδj
)
− 12
(
αj − βjδj
)2]
+
−βj
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
,
in which i is a cooperative player, j is a defector and the coalition consists of k players.
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2.3 Stability
To establish the number of players of a stable IEA we refer to notions of internal and
external stability (see [dAs+83]). We want highlight that these conditions are more
stringent and there are different papers that try to propose different ways to face the
problem (see [Fin03] and [EF06]). The basic idea is that a coalition is stable if no one
inside has an incentive to defect and no one outside has an incentive to join in. So,
called w the pay-off of a player, a coalition of k players is stable if are verified:
wCi (k) ≥ wNCi (k − 1), wNCj (k) ≥ wCj (k + 1),
where i is a cooperator and j is a defector. First condition is called internal stability,
while the second is called external stability.
Substituting optimal emissions in welfare functions, we can make explicit the stability
conditions. So, consider first the internal stability condition, we have

wCi (k) = δi
[
αi
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)
− 12
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)2]
+
−βi
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
+
∑k
h=1 sh,
wNCi (k − 1) = δi
[
αi
(
αi − βiδi
)
− 12
(
αi − βiδi
)2]
+
−βi
[∑k
p=1,p 6=i
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1,h6=i βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)
+ αi − βiδi
]
.
The internal stability condition is given by the inequality wCi (k)−wNCi (k− 1) ≥ 0. So,
simplifying and rearranging we have
wCi (k)−wNCi (k−1) = −
1
2δi
[( k∑
h=1
βh
)2
−β2i
]
+βi
[
1
δi
k∑
h=1,h6=i
βj+βi
k∑
h=1,h6=i
1
δh
]
+
k∑
h=1
sh ≥ 0,
which becomes
wCi (k)− wNCi (k − 1) = −
1
2δi
(
k∑
h=1,h6=i
βh
)2
+ β2i
(
k∑
h=1,h6=i
1
δh
)
+
k∑
h=1
sh ≥ 0 (2.5)
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Consider now the external stability condition, we have
wNCj (k) = δj
[
αj
(
αj − βjδj
)
− 12
(
αj − βjδj
)2]
+
−βj
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
,
wCj (k + 1) = δj
[
αj
(
αj − 1δj
(∑k
h=1 βk + βj
))
− 12
(
αj − 1δj
(∑k
h=1 βk + βj
))2]
+
−βj
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
(∑k
h=1 βk + βj
))
+
∑N
p=k+1,p 6=j
(
αp − βpδp
)
+
+αj − 1δj
(∑k
h=1 βk + βj
)]
+
∑k
h=1 sh + sj .
The external stability gives a number k such that, for each player j outside coalition
holds the inequality wNCj (k)− wCj (k + 1) ≥ 0.
After some algebra, we obtain
wNCj (k)− wCj (k + 1) =
1
2δj
[( k∑
h=1
βh
)2
+ 2βj
k∑
h=1
βh
]
+
− βj
[
βj
k∑
h=1
1
δh
+
1
δj
k∑
h=1
βh
]
−
k∑
h=1
sh + sj ≥ 0,
which becomes
wNCj (k)− wCj (k + 1) =
1
2δj
(
k∑
h=1
βh
)2
− β2j
(
k∑
h=1
1
δh
)
−
k∑
h=1
sh + sj ≥ 0 (2.6)
We can observe immediately that the social externality facilitates the stability of a
grand coalition. If we consider the effects of the externality on the stability conditions
we observe that it helps to obtain internal stability, but, on the other side, it has a
negative effect on external stability. That’s to say, if the externality is large enough,
we can have that every coalition is internal stable, while there is no size k for which
we have external stability. So, the only stable coalition is the grand coalition. Suppose
now that there exist two kinds of player, developed countries, identified by subscript 1,
and developing countries, called 2. We assume that within each subgroup players are
homogeneous, and that the coalition is arranged by n1 players of kind 1 and n2 of kind
2, with n1 and n2 positive integers such that n1 + n2 ≤ N . So, we are assuming that
within each group, all players have the same parameters: for countries of kind 1 we have
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(α1, δ1, β1, s1), while for countries of kind 2 we have (α2, δ2, β2, s2).
We must specify the stability conditions for developed countries and for developing ones.
So, every condition generate two different inequalities.
For internal stability, we have the two inequalities
wC1 (k)− wNC1 (k − 1) =−
1
2δ1
(
(n1 − 1)β1 + n2β2
)2
+
+ β21
(
n1 − 1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+ s1n1 + s2n2 ≥ 0; (2.7a)
wC2 (k)− wNC2 (k − 1) =−
1
2δ2
(
n1β1 + (n2 − 1)β2
)2
+
+ β22
(
n1
δ1
+
n2 − 1
δ2
)
+ s1n1 + s2n2 ≥ 0. (2.7b)
For external stability condition, similarly:
wNC1 (k)− wC1 (k + 1) =
1
2δ1
(
n1β1 + n2β2
)2
− β21
(
n1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+
− s1(n1 + 1)− s2n2 ≥ 0; (2.8a)
wNC2 (k)− wC2 (k + 1) =
1
2δ2
(
n1β1 + n2β2
)2
− β22
(
n1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+
− s1n1 − s2(n2 + 1) ≥ 0. (2.8b)
2.3.1 Existence of a Stable Coalition
We want to find the size of a stable coalition by solving the system of inequalities (2.7a),
(2.7b), (2.8a) and (2.8b) that is not analytically tractable in general. We suppose a
proportionality between the parameters as follows
β1
β2
=
δ2
δ1
=
s1
s2
= σ
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for a natural numer σ ∈ N .
Thus, if σ is greater than one, we have that β1 > β2, δ2 > δ1 and s1 > s2. This implies
that if countries of kind 1 have more vulnerability to environmental damage, than they
have a smaller marginal shift parameter and a greater inclination to join in coalition.
We want highlight that the implication δ1 < δ2, doesn’t mean that countries of kind 2
have an higher production function, because of the presence of parameters α1 and α2.
We start by considering the condition (2.7a)
− 1
2δ1
(
h1β1 + h2β2 − β1
)2
+ β22
(
h1 − 1
δ1
+
h2
δ2
)
+ s1h1 + s2h2 ≥ 0.
After some rearrangements we have
− β
2
2
2δ1
(h1σ + h2 − σ)2 + β
2
1
δ2
(h1σ + h2 − σ) + s2(σh1 + h2) ≥ 0;
in which we define
y = h1σ + h2,
and than the condition become
−y2 + 2δ1
β22
(
σβ22
δ1
+
β21
δ2
+ s2
)
y − σ2 β
2
2
2δ1
2δ1
β22
− σβ
2
1
δ2
2δ1
β22
≥ 0.
Simplifying and rewriting in term of σ, we have
−y2 + 2
(
σ + σ +
δ1s2
β22
)
y − σ2 − 2σ2 ≥ 0,
and if we denote by
t =
δ1s2
β22
, t > 0,
we have the inequality
− y2 + 2(2σ + t)y − 3σ2 ≥ 0. (2.9)
Let us call y
(2.7a)
1 , y
(2.7a)
2 the solutions of the equation −y2 + 2(2σ + t)y − 3σ2 = 0:
y
(2.7a)
1 = 2σ + t−
√
(2σ + t)2 − 3σ2, y(2.7a)2 = 2σ + t+
√
(2σ + t)2 − 3σ2
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Similarly for condition (2.7b) we have
− y2 + 2(2 + tσ)y − 3 ≥ 0. (2.10)
Let us call y
(2.7b)
1 , y
(2.7b)
2 the solutions of the equation −y2 + 2(2 + tσ)y − 3 = 0
y
(2.7b)
1 = 2 + tσ −
√
(2 + tσ)2 − 3, y(2.7b)2 = 2 + tσ +
√
(2 + tσ)2 − 3
We follow the same way to reduce the external stability inequalities in a more simple
form. So, for condition (2.8a) we have
y2 − 2(t+ σ)y − 2tσ ≥ 0, (2.11)
and, if we call y
(2.8a)
1 , y
(2.8a)
2 the solutions of the equation y
2 − 2(t + σ)y − 2tσ = 0, we
found
y
(2.8a)
1 = t+ σ −
√
(t+ σ)2 + 2tσ, y
(2.8a)
2 = t+ σ +
√
(t+ σ)2 + 2tσ
For condition (2.8b) we have
y2 − 2(1 + tσ)y − 2tσ ≥ 0. (2.12)
So, the solutions y
(2.8b)
1 , y
(2.8b)
2 of the equation y
2 − 2(1 + tσ)y − 2tσ = 0, are
y
(2.8b)
1 = 1 + tσ −
√
(1 + tσ)2 + 2tσ, y
(2.8b)
2 = 1 + tσ +
√
(1 + tσ)2 + 2tσ
The solutions of inequalities (2.9) and (2.10) are the intervals [y
(2.7a)
1 , y
(2.7a)
2 ], [y
(2.7b)
1 , y
(2.7b)
2 ]
respectively and the solutions of inequalities (2.11) and (2.12) are the complements of the
intervals ]y
(2.8a)
1 , y
(2.8a)
2 [ and ]y
(2.8b)
1 , y
(2.8b)
2 [. Let us note that y
(2.8a)
1 < 0 and y
(2.8b)
1 < 0,
while y
(2.7a)
1 , y
(2.8a)
2 , y
(2.8b)
2 , y
(2.7b)
2 , y
(2.7a)
2 > 0.
Proposition (Existence of a stable coalition) We have that
y
(2.7b)
2 − y(2.8b)2 = 1
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Moreover, assume that σ ≥ 1, t ≥ 1 and if σ = 1 or t = 1 we have
y
(2.8a)
2 ≤ y(2.8b)2 ≤ y(2.7b)2 ≤ y(2.7a)2
and there exists a natural number y¯ ∈ [y(2.8b)2 , y(2.7b)2 ] satisfying the four inequalities
(2.9), (2.10), (2.11) and (2.12).
Proof.
y
(2.7b)
2 − y(2.8b)2 = 2 + tσ +
√
(2 + tσ)2 − 3− [1 + tσ +
√
(1 + tσ)2 + 2tσ] = 1
because
(2 + tσ)2 − 3 = (1 + tσ)2 + 2tσ
for any σ and any t. Then y
(2.8b)
2 ≤ y(2.7b)2 .
The inequality y
(2.8a)
2 ≤ y(2.8b)2 , i.e.
t+ σ +
√
(t+ σ)2 + 2tσ ≤ 1 + tσ +
√
(1 + tσ)2 + 2tσ
is true because σ + t ≤ 1 + tσ for σ ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1.
The inequality y
(2.7b)
2 ≤ y(2.7a)2 , i.e.
2 + tσ +
√
(2 + tσ)2 − 3 ≤ 2σ + t+
√
(2σ + t)2 − 3σ2
is true because if we assume t = 1 we have
2 + σ +
√
(2 + σ)2 − 3 ≤ 2σ + 1 +
√
(2σ + 1)2 − 3σ2
then
2 + σ ≤ 2σ + 1
that is true for σ ≥ 1. Similarly the case σ = 1 for any t ≥ 1 (the assumption σ = 1 gives
the symmetry between developed and developing countries). For the case σ ∈ (0, 1) the
solutions are the same, and the proof is similar to σ > 1, we just need to invert the
parameters’ relations.
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We have shown that, under some assumptions on the parameters, a solution exists, but
we did no discuss about the size and the composition of a stable coalition. Note that
there is no a unique stable coalition since all coalitions made by n1 developed countries
and n2 developing countries such that n1σ + n2 = y¯ are stable coalitions. In order to
make more considerations, we in the following some numerical simulations.
First of all we need to calibrate the parameters, and we have to choose values which
respect the constraint ei > 0 for each i ∈ I. So, for i = {1, 2}, we take αi ∈ [5, 10],
δi ∈ [0.3, 0.9], βi ∈ [0.001, 0.01]. Moreover, we assume si ∈ [0.3, 0.9] and that we have
100 countries, equally distributed between developed and developing countries, than
n1 ∈ [0, 50] and n2 ∈ [0, 50], clearly n1 and n2 are both natural numbers.
Example 2.1. In this first example, we choose parameters such that β1 > β2, δ2 > δ1
and s1 > s2.
So, we take
δ1 = 0.3, δ2 = 0.5, β1 = 0.01, β2 = 0.001, s1 = 0.5, s2 = 0.3.
We test 64 different combinations of n1 and n2, assuming n1 = 1 + 7j and n2 = 1 + 7p.
The combinations of n1 and n2 are given by all the possible permutations of the indeces
j and p, where j, p = {1, . . . , 7}. We summarize the results in two cartesian diagram,
the first in figure 2.1 shows the internal and external stability conditions for developed
countries, while in figure 2.2 we have the internal and external stability conditions for
developed countries.
Figures must be read as follows: on the x axis we have the combinations of n1 and n2
given by the 64 permutations of the indeces j, p. So, x = 1 is given by j = 0, p = 0;
x = 2 is given by p = 0, j = 1 and so on.
On the y axis there are the values of stability conditions, for each combination of n1 and
n2. Then, the stability conditions are verified if the points lie in first quadrant, while are
not verified if lie in the fourth quadrant. From figure 2.1 we can see that every coalition
considered is internally stable for developed countries, but is not externally stable. Then,
the result is that all the players of kind 1 outside coalition have an incentive to join. We
want remark that, from [PZ13], without externality the maximal size of a stable coalition
can be achieved with n1 = 2.
Considering figure 2.2 we have that also for developing countries the internal stability
condition is always verified, while the external one is not never. So, all the developing
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countries have an incentive to join in.
Follows that we can observe a case in which the grand coalition is the only stable coalition.
Example 2.2. In the second example we want reverse the relations between parameters,
so we take
δ1 = 0.5, δ2 = 0.3, β1 = 0.001, β2 = 0.01, s1 = 0.3, s2 = 0.5.
We test the 64 combinations given by the permutation of the indeces j and p of n1 = 1+7j
and n2 = 1 + 7p, as in example 2.1.
We report the results of our simulations in figures 2.3 and 2.4. From figure 2.3 we can
see that for developed countries every coalition is internally stable, but there is not a
coalition which gives external stability.
In figure 2.4 we show the results for developing countries. The conclusion is the same:
all developing countries in coalition have no incentive to defect, while all those out have
an incentive to join.
Then, we have another example in which the only stable coalition is the grand coalition.
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To try to explain the results of the last two examples, we want highlight that the social
externality acts to make stable the coalition from inside, because of has a positive effect
on internal stability conditions. On the other side, it works to make unstable the coalition
from outside, because of has a negative effect on external stability conditions. Than, if
the externality is larger enough the result is that the players inside coalition have no
incentive to defect from cooperation, while all players outside have no incentive to stay
out. So, we can have that all players join in coalition.
Chapter 3
Two-player Differential Games
In this Chapter we analyze the effects of a Social Externality in a dynamical context.
We consider the differential framework presented in [MZ13]. We have two players, one
representative of the developed countries while the other represents developing countries.
We assume that the latter player has a gradual involvement in environmental concern,
which is connected with economic growth. We assume that players start acting non-
cooperatively and that there is a time in the short run in which they decide to sign an
agreement. In this way, we can consider also the negotiation time.
We characterize the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions of the global emission
game by using Dynamic Programming method. After that, we study if the coalition
of the two players is stable in the short run. Different from the static model, here the
Externality function which affects the cooperative welfares, is a function of time. The
Chapter is divided as follows: is Section 1 we present the model and its functional form;
in Section 2 we find the emission solutions and in Section 3 we analyze the stability
conditions, showing some numerical results.
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3.1 The Model
We consider a two-player differential game, in which player 1 represents developed coun-
tries and player 2 represents developing countries. The main difference between two
players is that for player 2 the environmental protection is not on the top of economic
agenda. So, we characterize two different damage-cost functions, assuming that for
player 1 the damage-cost is full from the outset, while for player 2 is an increasing func-
tion of time and become full when the player achieves a preset threshold in discounted
revenues. The idea of linking environmental concern and income of a country is not new
in literature (see e.g., [SB92] for an empirical analysis). Moreover, this approach is in
the spirit of Kyoto protocol, in which reducing emissions is responsibility of developed
countries. The motivations of this approach are both historical and economical. From
the first point of view, we have that the actual level of pollution can not be attributed
to developing countries, so it’s not fair ask them to assume the commitment to reduce
it. On the other side, developing countries have some economic priorities (e.g., improve
infrastructures, increase per capita wealth and instruction level), so that environment is
a luxury good.
We make the usual assumption that emissions are a by-product of production, and for
a suitable production function we can use emissions like a inputs of industrial process.
So, for each player i, i = 1, 2, we can write the production function as: fi(ei), where ei
are the emission of player i. Then, if we denote we ρ the rate of time preference, we can
define with T the instant (T > 0), at which player 2 become developed, as the time at
which is verified: ∫ T
0
fi(ei)e
−ρtdt = Y¯2,
where, Y¯2 is the threshold chosen.
Then, for player 2 the damage-cost function is described for any t in two intervals:
D2(S(t), Y2(t)) =

d2(S(t), Y2(t)) ∀Y2(t) < Y¯2,
D2(S(t)) ∀Y2(t) ≥ Y¯2,
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for d2 and D2 suitable functions.
We have that the stock of pollutant, called S, follows the dynamics

S˙ = µ(e1 + e2)− SS,
S(0) = S0,
where µ is a positive scale parameter, δ is the positive natural absorption rate of pollution
and S0 is the given initial level of pollution stock. The assumption of rational players
leads to consider that each player maximizes his discounted welfare, that we denote by
w:
max
e1
w1 = max
e1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(f1(e1)−D1(S))dt,
max
e2
w2 = max
e2
∫ T
0
e−ρt(f(e2)− d2(S, Y2))dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(t−T )(f2(e2)−D2(S))dt,
subject to
S˙ = µ(e1 + e2)− δS, S(0) = S0.
3.1.1 Functional Forms and Maximization Problems
For the functional forms of the model we assume a quadratic function for production
function, that’s a common choice in literature (see e.g., [STZ11] and [DL93]), while for
damage-cost function we take linear functions of S, as follows
fi(ei) = αiei − 1
2
e2i ,
D1(S) = β1S,
D2(S(t), Y2(t)) =

d2(S, Y2) =
t
T γβ2S, ∀Y2(t) < Y¯2,
D2(S) = β2S ∀Y2(t) ≥ Y¯2,
where ei ∈ ∆, with ∆ that is the strategy space (∆ is a real interval), and the parameters
αi are strictly positive. So, we implicitly make the assumption that fi(ei) is strictly
positive for every possible values of ei. In the damage-cost function we assume that
βi are strictly positive parameters. The assumption of linearity is a simplification, but
we expect that its effects are quantitative and not qualitative. Moreover, we assume
γ ∈ {0, 1}. The case γ = 0 is when player 2 have not at all consideration about
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environmental issue, while γ = 1 is the case of gradual involvement. Finally, we assume
that the externality function is a quadratic and decreasing function of time
Ext(t) = −t2 + t?,
where t? ∈ [0, T ] is the starting time of cooperation. The hypothesis is that when
countries have make the decision to join or not an agreement, they consider all possi-
ble earnings due to relations with other countries. Than, we add the positive function
Ext(t) to the cooperative welfare. We want remark that the externality is not related
with the control variable ei, so don’t affects the maximization process.
The assumption of a decreasing externality deals with the will of non overestimate its
effect on the stability of the coalition.
We assume that exists a time t? ∈ [0, T ] at which the two players begin to cooperate. We
can interpret the interval [0, t?] as the period in which player 1 and player 2 negotiate the
environmental agreements. We have the players maximize non-cooperatively in [0, t?]
and maximize the joint welfare in [t?,∞), as follows
• for t ∈ [0, t?]:
max
e1
∫ t?
0
(f1(e1)−D1(S))e−ρtdt,
max
e2
∫ t?
0
(f2(e2)− d2(S, Y2))e−ρtdt,
• for t ∈ [t?,∞):
max
e1,e2
{∫ T
t?
(f1(e1) + f2(e2)−D1(S)− d2(S, Y2) + Ext(t))e−ρ(t−t?)dt+
+
∫ ∞
T
(f1(e1) + f2(e2)−D1(S)−D2(S) + Ext(t))e−ρ(t−T )dt
}
,
both problems subject to 
S˙ = µ(e1 + e2)− δS,
S(0) = S0.
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3.2 Emission Solutions
In order to find the feedback Nash equilibrium we proceed to solve the optimization
problems backward. So, we first characterize the cooperative solutions.
3.2.1 Cooperative Solutions
Let us call T ? the instant of time at which player 2 becomes developed with optimal
emission.
We consider first the case of the interval [T ?,∞). The optimization problem is given by
max
e1,e2
∫ ∞
T ?
(f1(e1) + f2(e2)−D1(S)−D2(S) + Ext(t))e−ρtdt,
subject to: S˙(t) = µ(e1 + e2)− δS, S(0) = S0.
(3.1)
Let v(t, S) the value function, we have the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
−vt = max
e1,e2
{(
α1e1 +α2e2− 1
2
(e21 +e
2
2)−S(β1 +β2)+Ext(t)
)
e−ρt+vs(µ(e1 +e2)−δS)
}
.
(3.2)
Assuming an interior solution, the maximization of the right-hand of the equation gives
ei = αi + µvse
ρt.
We assume that value function is linear in S, as follows
v(t, S) = (KS + L(t))e−ρt,
which has the following partial derivatives: vt = −ρ(KS + L(t) − L′(t))e−ρt and vS =
Ke−ρt.
So, the emission solution is given by ei = αi +Kµ.
Substituting the expression of ei, vs and vt in (3.1), for the principle of identity of
polynomials we have
ρK = −β1 − β2 − δK,
K = −β1 + β2
ρ+ δ
.
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Then, for each player i, in the interval [T,∞), the optimal emissions e?i are
e?i (t) = αi − µ
β1 + β2
ρ+ δ
, i = 1, 2. (3.3)
Consider now the interval [t?, T ?].
Due to the change in damage cost function of player 2, the optimization problem is
max
e1,e2
∫ T ?
t?
[
(α1e1 + α2e2 − 1
2
(e21 + e
2
2)− S
(
β1 + γβ2
t
T ?
)
+ Ext(t)
]
e−ρtdt,
subject to S˙(t) = µ(e1 + e2)− δS, S(0) = S0.
Called v(t, S) the value function, we have the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
−vt = max
e1,e2
{(
α1e1+α2e2−1
2
(e21+e
2
2)−S
(
β1+γβ2
t
T ?
)
+Ext(t)
)
e−ρt+vs(µ(e1+e2)−δS)
}
.
(3.4)
From the first order conditions in (3.4) we can derive the expression
ei(t) = αi + µvSe
ρt.
We assume a value function linear in S, with non-constant coefficients, as follows
v(t, S) = [g(t)S + z(t)]e−ρt,
whose partial derivatives respect t and S are
vt = [(g
′(t)− ρg(t))S + z′(t)− z(t)]e−ρt, vS = g(t)e−ρt.
The expression of vS give us the emission solutions
ei(t) = αi + µg(t), i = 1, 2.
To find the solution we need to substitute emission and derivatives of value function in
(3.4). After some algebra, we derive the differential equation

ρg(t)− g′(t) = −β1 − γ tT ?β2 − δg(t)
g(T ?) = K = −β1+β2ρ+δ ,
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which has the unique solution
g(t) = − β1
ρ+ δ
− β2
T ?(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1+ t(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?))−e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?)T ?(ρ+δ)(γ−1)].
So, optimal emission for player i in the interval [t?, T ?] are given by
e?i (t) = αi−µ
β1
ρ+ δ
−µ β2
T ?(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1+t(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?))−e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?)T ?(ρ+δ)(γ−1)],
(3.5)
where i = 1, 2.
3.2.2 Non-Cooperative Solutions
We now consider the non-cooperative problems in the interval [0, t?]. In this interval the
players maximize their own welfare, as follows
max
e1
w1 = max
e1
∫ t?
0
(
α1e1 − 1
2
e21 − β1S
)
e−ρtdt,
max
e2
w2 = max
e2
∫ t?
0
(
α2e2 − 1
2
e22 − γβ2
t
T ?
S
)
e−ρtdt.
In this case we have two value functions, v1(t, S) and v2(t, S), which give us the two
HJB equations
−v1t = maxe1
{(
α1 − 1
2
e21 − β1S
)
e−ρt + v1s(µ(e1 + e2)− δS)
}
,
−v2t = maxe2
{(
α2 − 1
2
e22 − γ
t
T ?
β2S
)
e−ρt + v2s(µ(e1 + e2)− δS)
}
.
(3.6)
The maximization on the right-hand of the equations (3.6) leads to emissions
ei(t) = αi + µv
i
S .
We assume for each player i a value function linear in S, as follows
vi(t, S) = (xi(t)S + yi(t))e
−ρt,
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which have first derivatives as follows
vt = [(x
′
i(t)− ρxi(t))S + y′(t)− y(t)]e−ρt, vS = xi(t)e−ρt.
Then, the expression of the emissions becomes
ei(t) = αi + µxi(t).
Substituting ei, vt and vS inside (3.6) leads to the differential equations
x˙1(t) = β1 + (ρ+ δ)x1(t),
x˙2(t) = γ
t
T ?β2 + (ρ+ δ)x2(t),
which have both the same final condition
xi(t
?) = − β1
ρ+ δ
− β2
T ?(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ(1+t′(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t′−T ?))−e(ρ+δ)(t′−T ?)T (ρ+δ)(γ−1)].
The system has a unique solution (x1(t), x2(t)), that characterize the unique emission
solution (e?1, e
?
2) in the interval [0, t
?]:

x1(t) = − β1ρ+δ+
− β2
T ?(ρ+δ)2
e(ρ+δ)(t−t?)
[
γ(1 + t?(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)(t?−T ?)) + e(ρ+δ)(t?−T ?)T ?(ρ+ δ)(1− γ)
]
,
x2(t) = − β1ρ+δe(ρ+δ)(t−t
?)+
− β2
T ?(ρ+δ)2
[
γ(1 + t(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)) + e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?)T ?(ρ+ δ)(1− γ)
]
.
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So, the emission solutions are given by
e?1(t) = α1 − µ
β1
ρ+ δ
+
− µ β2
T ?(ρ+ δ)2
e(ρ+δ)(t−t
?)
[
γ(1 + t?(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)(t?−T ?)) + e(ρ+δ)(t?−T ?)T ?(ρ+ δ)(1− γ)
]
,
e?2(t) = α2 − µ
β1
ρ+ δ
e(ρ+δ)(t−t
?)+
− µ β2
T ?(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ(1 + t(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)) + e(ρ+δ)(t−T ?)T ?(ρ+ δ)(1− γ)
]
.
(3.7)
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3.3 Stability Conditions
In this section we analyze the effects of the social externality on the stability of the
coalition in the short run.
We refer to the notion of internal and external stability, like in [dAs+83]. So, in the
general case, a coalition formed by k players is stable if are verified the two conditions
wCi (k) ≥ wNCi (k − 1), wNCj (k) ≥ wCj (k + 1),
The first inequality, called internal stability, says that no player inside coalition has
an incentive to defect, while the second inequality, called external stability, says that
no player outside coalition has an incentive to join in. We have a two-player game,
than we deal just with the internal stability condition. So, we have to analyze for each
player if the cooperative welfare is greater than the non-cooperative welfare. We need
an expression for full time non-cooperative emissions, denoted by eN1 and e
N
2 , that we
take from [MZ13]
eN1 (t) = α1 − µ
β1
ρ+ δ
,
eN2 (t) = α2 − µ
β2
TN (ρ+ δ)2
[
γ(t(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)(t−TN )) + e(ρ+δ)(t−TN )TN (ρ+ δ)(1− γ)
]
,
where TN is the instant of time at which player 2 becomes developed when emission is
eN2 (t).
Than, the stability condition of our model are given by
∫ Tm
t′
[f1(e
?
1)−D1(S?) + Ext(t)]e−ρ(t−t
?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f1(e
N
1 )−D1(SN )]dt,
∫ Tm
t?
[f2(e
?
2)− d2(S?) + Ext(t)]e−ρ(t−t
?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f(eN2 )− d2(SN )]dt,
where Tm = min{T ?, TN} and SN and S? are the pollutant stock in the non-cooperative
and cooperative cases. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve the stability conditions
analytically, due to the number of parameters and the high degree of non-linearity.
Then, we present some numerical results, analyzing separately the case γ = 0 and γ = 1.
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If γ = 0 stability conditions are
∫ Tm
t?
[f1(e
?
1)− β1S? + Ext(t)]e−ρ(t−t
?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f1(e
N
1 )− β1SN ]dt,
∫ Tm
t?
[f2(e
?
2) + Ext(t)]e
−ρ(t−t?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f(eN2 )]dt.
In the case of γ = 1 we have
∫ Tm
t?
[f1(e
?
1)− β1S? + Ext(t)]e−ρ(t−t
?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f1(e
N
1 )− β1SN ]dt,
∫ Tm
t?
[f2(e
?
2)−
t
Tm
β2S
? + Ext(t)]e−ρ(t−t
?)dt ≥
∫ Tm
t?
e−ρ(t−t
?)[f(eN2 )−
t
Tm
β2S
N ]dt.
In order to make some simulations, we calibrate parameters as follows: based on [Nor93],
we fix δ = 0.0083 and µ = 0.64, with δ ∈ [0.001, 0.01] e µ ∈ [0.02, 0.2], while for the
other parameters we assume ρ ∈ [0.02, 0.2], αi ∈ [0.5, 1] e βi ∈ [0.001, 0.01], for i = 1, 2.
We consider 243 different combinations of parameters αi, βi, δ and ρ. Before proceed to
analyze the stability conditions we determine the value of T ? e TN , for all the combina-
tions of parameters selected. Moreover, we consider different values of starting time of
cooperation t? ∈ [0, T ].
When γ = 1 there is a large region of parameters for which coalition is stable also with-
out externality. For example, if ρ is closer to 0.1, then the coalition is stable for all
values of the other parameters.
When γ = 0 the externality have a determinant role. In fact, if t? > 0, from simulations
we have T ? < TN that implies eN2 > e
?
2, condition for which we can’t have stability for
player 2 without externality. Nevertheless, we have the same results also for t? = 0.
In figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 we study the case of γ = 0, with t? = T
?
2 . On the x axis
we have all the combinations of parameters, while on the y axis we have the values of
stability conditions. We consider those values as the difference between cooperative and
non-cooperative welfare of each player, for each combination of parameters. Then, the
stability is given when the values are positive.
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When there is no externality, we observe that player 2 has no incentive to make an
agreement with player 1, then the coalition is not stable. From figure 3.3 and 3.4 we
have that in the same condition the presence of a social externality can enforce the
agreement between player 1 and player 2.
We note that from our simulations, there is not significant difference changing the start-
ing time t?.
In figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 we study the case of γ = 0, with t? = T
?
2 . On the x axis
we have all the combinations of parameters, while on the y axis we have the values of
stability conditions. We consider those values as the difference between cooperative and
non-cooperative welfare of each player, for each combination of parameters. Then, the
stability is given when the values are positive.
When there is no externality, we observe that player 2 has no incentive to make an
agreement with player 1, then the coalition is not stable. From figure 3.3 and 3.4 we
have that in the same condition the presence of a social externality can enforce the
agreement between player 1 and player 2.
We note that from our simulations, there is not significant difference changing the start-
ing time t?.
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Chapter 4
N-player Differential Games
In this last Chapter, we will extend the two-player framework of the previous model,
assuming now that we have N players. Players are divided in two different kinds, devel-
oped countries and developing countries. Within each group players are homogeneous.
Respect the two-player differential game, we have an Externality function which depends
on number of countries in coalition and miantain the same functional forms about pro-
duction and damage-cost functions. We assume that cooperation starts from the outset
of the game. As for the static model, we start by solving the global emission game,
assuming a partial cooperative framework. We characterize the emission solutions both
for cooperators and for defectors differentiating between developed and developing coun-
tries.
After that we discuss about the stability of the coalition, assuming that we are looking
for a self-enforcing agreement. We use some numerical simulations to test if the Social
Externality can lead to a stable and grand coalition. The rest of the Chapter is divided
as follows: in Section 1 we present the model and its functional forms; in Section 2 we
characterize the emission solution and in Section 3 we discuss about stability, showing
some numerical simulations.
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4.1 The Model
We consider a N -player differential game, assuming the world divided in two kinds of
countries. So, we have a total number of players N = N1+N2, in which N1 are developed
countries and N2 are developing countries (N,N1 and N2 are integer numbers). We use
1 to denote developed countries and 2 to denote developing countries. The hypothesis of
homogeneity within the two groups, allow us to consider the game like a 4-player differ-
ential game, in which two players cooperate and two players defect. We approach this
game with the notion of partial cooperative equilibrium, as we did in previous Chapters.
We extend the global emission differential game investigated in [MZ13].
First of all, due to the fact that emissions are by-product of industrial activities, and
assuming that the function that relates emissions and production are smooth and in-
vertible, we can express the production for country i as a function of emission levels,
and we indicate it with fi(ei), being ei the emission of country i.
Moreover, our hypothesis is that developed countries have an higher degree of interest
in environmental issues respect developing countries, both for economic and historical
motivations. In the end, this is the same approach of the Kyoto protocol.
The point is: a developing country need to improve his infrastructures, increasing per
capita wealth, life expectance, instruction level, etc. In this context, environment is a
”luxury good”. In addition, the actual level of stock pollutant cannot be attributed to
developing countries.
The power of this framework lies in the different degree of internalization of the envi-
ronmental damage-cost. While the cost function, denoted by Di(S), where S(t) is the
stock of pollutant at time t, is full from the outset for developed countries, we suppose
that for developing countries we have a gradual internalization of the cost. For this kind
of players the full damage-cost is related to the achievement of a preset threshold in
terms of cumulatives revenues. The idea of linking income and environmental quality is
not new in literature, there’s the well-known environmental Kutznets curve (EKC) and
some works, like [SB92], that support the empirical consistence of this hypothesis.
So, denoting by ρ the rate of time preference, we define the time T as the instant (T > 0)
at which a country of kind 2 becomes developed, that is the time at which is verified:
∫ T
0
fi(ei)e
−ρtdt = Y¯2,
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where, Y¯2 is the threshold chosen.
Then, for players 2 the damage-cost function is described for any t in two intervals:
D2(S(t), Y2(t)) =

d2(S(t), Y2(t)) ∀Y2(t) < Y¯2,
D2(S(t)) ∀Y2(t) ≥ Y¯2,
for d2 and D2 suitable functions. The stock of pollutant S(t) is solution of the following
differential equation:
S˙(t) = µ
(
N∑
1
ei(t)
)
− δS(t), S(0) = S0,
where µ is a positive scaling parameter and δ is the natural rate of absorption of pollu-
tion. Here S0 is the initial value of the pollution.
As for players 2, we denote by D1(S) the damage-cost function for developed countries.
In this case, we have the same form for all the interval [0,∞). We can now introduce
the payoff of player i, i = 1, 2, as follows:
w1 =
∫ ∞
0
(f1(e1)−D1(S))e−ρtdt,
and
w2 =
∫ T
0
(f2(e2)− d2(S))e−ρtdt+
∫ ∞
T
(f2(e2)−D2(S))e−ρ(t−T )dt.
4.1.1 Functional Forms
In this section we specify the functional forms of the model.
For production function we assume that fi(ei) is a concave and increasing function, that’s
a standard assumption in literature (see, e.g., [RC05]; [DS06], [Fin01]). We choose a
linear damage-cost function of stock of pollutant, that is a common choice (see [HS97],
[BSZ10]) and is supported by some empirical estimation (see [LL03]). Also for externality
function, denoted by Ext(n1, n2), we make the assumption that is a positive linear
function of coalition dimension (see [CR06]).
So, we have the following functional forms:
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fi(ei) = αiei − 1
2
e2i ,
Ext(n1, n2) = s1n1 + s2n2,
D1(S) = β1S,
D2(S(t), Y2(t)) =

t
T γβ2S, ∀Y2(t) < Y¯2,
β2S ∀Y2(t) ≥ Y¯2,
with ei ∈ ∆, where ∆ is the strategy space. We impose some limits to parameters choice.
Specifically, we assume αi and βi to be strictly positive for i = 1, 2, in this way we have
that fi(ei) is positive for all possible value of emissions and that the damage-cost is an
increasing function of stock of pollutant. The same assumption, for the same reason, is
made for the marginal externality si. With ni we state the number of players of kind
i that join in coalition, precisely ni ∈ {0, 1, ..., Ni}, i = 1, 2. Moreover, we suppose
γ ∈ {0, 1}. The case γ = 0 is equivalent to say that players of kind 2 don’t allow for
pollution at all, until they reach the threshold Y¯2 (that’s the spirit of Kyoto protocol).
If γ = 1, we are in the case of gradual internalization of damage cost.
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4.2 Emission Solutions
In this section we characterize the emission solutions both for cooperators and non-
cooperators. We suppose that we have a set C of cooperator players, with n1 developed
countries and n2 developing countries. The set of non-cooperators is denoted by NC and
is arranged by NC1 = (N1 − n1) developed countries and NC2 = (N2 − n2) developing
countries. As usual, every player j ∈ NC maximize his own welfare, while players in C
maximize the joint welfare. Due for homogeneity within groups, we just have to find four
emission solutions: two for cooperators (called eC1 and e
C
2 ), and two for the defectors
(called eNC1 and e
NC
2 ).
Thus, the problem for non-cooperators is:
max
e1
∫ ∞
0
(f1(e1)−D1(S))e−ρtdt, (4.1)
and
max
e2
∫ TN
0
(f2(e2)− d2 − (S))e−ρtdt+
∫ ∞
TN
(f2(e2)−D2(S))e−ρ(t−TN )dt (4.2)
subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(∑N
1 ei(t)
)
− δS(t), S(0) = S0,
For cooperators, the joint maximization is:
max
e1,e2
∫ TC
0
(n1f1(e1) + n2f2(e2)− n1D1(S)− n2d2(S) + Ext(n1, n2))e−ρtdt+∫ ∞
TC
(n1f1(e1) + n2f2(e2)− n1D1(S)− n2D2(S) + Ext(n1, n2))e−ρ(t−TC)dt,
(4.3)
subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(∑N
1 ei(t)
)
− δS(t), S(0) = S0.
In the maximization problems we call TN and TC the instants of time at which a
developing country achieves the threshold to become developed, respectively in the non-
cooperative and cooperative case.
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4.2.1 Non-cooperative Emissions
To solve the problem, we use Dynamic Programming method. We proceed backward,
solving first the problem on [TN ,∞). So, we have to solve first:
max
eNCi
∫ ∞
TN
(
αie
NC
i −
1
2
(eNCi )
2 − βiS
)
e−ρ(t−T
N )dt,
subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(∑N
1 ei(t)
)
− δS(t), S(0) = S0.
If we denote with v(t, S) the value function of the problem, we can write the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
− vt = max
eNCi
{(
αiei − 1
2
(eNCi )
2 − βiS
)
e−ρt + vS
(
µ
N∑
j=1
ej − δS
)}
(4.4)
Solving the first order conditions in (4.4), we obtain an expression for the non-cooperative
emissions
eNCi (t) = αi + µvSe
ρt.
Let us assume that value function v(t, S) is linear in S
v(t, S) = (KS + L)e−ρt,
with partial derivatives vt = −ρ(KS + L)e−ρt and vS = Ke−ρt. So, emissions for a
player i outside coalition are given by
eNCi (t) = αi +Kµ.
In order to find an expression for the parameter K, we substitute vt, vS and ei inside
(4.4)
ρ(KS + L)e−ρt =
[
αi(αi +Kµ)− 1
2
(αi +Kµ)
2 − βiS
]
e−ρt +K
(
µ
N∑
j=1
ej − δS
)
e−ρt
ρ(KS + L) = α2i + αiKµ−
1
2
α2i −
1
2
K2µ2 − αiKµ− βiS +Kµ
N∑
j=1
ej −KδS
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ρKS + ρL = −(βi +Kδ)S + 1
2
α2i −
1
2
K2µ2 +Kµ
N∑
j=1
ej .
By the principle of identity of polynomials, we can write the equation
ρK = −βi −Kδ,
from which we have that K = − βiρ+δ .
Finally, we have the expression of non-cooperative emissions
eNCi (t) = αi − µ
βi
ρ+ δ
, i = 1, 2. (4.5)
We proceed now to find the non-cooperative emissions for t ∈ [0, TN ].
Since the functional forms for players of kind 1 is the same in the entire period, we have
that the emissions of developed countries are the same in [0, TN ]:
eNC1 (t) = α1 − µ
β1
ρ+ δ
, ∀t ≥ 0.
For devoloping countries we have to consider the different damage-cost function, so the
problem is:
max
eNC2
∫ TN
0
(
α2e
NC
2 −
1
2
(eNC2 )
2 − γ t
TN
β2S
)
e−ρtdt,
subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(∑N
1 ei(t)
)
− δS(t), S(0) = S0.
In this case the HJB equation is given by
− vt = max
e2
{(
α2e2 − 1
2
e22 − γ
t
TN
β2S
)
e−ρt + vS
(
µ
N∑
j=1
ej − δS
)}
. (4.6)
As usual, we derive the first order conditions from maximization in (4.6)
(α2 − e2)e−ρt + vsµ = 0,
then
eNC2 (t) = α2 + vSµe
ρt.
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For the value function v(t, S) we assume
v(t, S) = [x(t)S + y(t)]e−ρt,
whose partial derivatives are: vt = [(x
′(t)−ρx(t))S+y′(t)−ρy(t)]e−ρt and vS = x(t)e−ρt.
The emissions are given by
eNC2 (t) = α2 + µx(t).
Now, we have to substitute vt, vS and e2 inside (4.6)
−[(x′(t)− ρx(t))S + y′(t)− ρy(t)]e−ρt =
[
α2(α2 + µx(t))− 1
2
(α2 + µx(t))
2 − γ t
TN
β2S
]
e−ρt+
+x(t)
(
µ
N∑
j=1
ej − δS
)
e−ρt.
Rearranging respect S and by the principle of identity of polynomials, we can write the
differential equation 
−x′(t) + (ρ+ δ)x(t) = −γ t
TN
β2,
x(TN ) = − β2ρ+δ .
The solution x(t) is given by
x(t) = − β2
TN (ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1 + t(ρ+ δ)− e(ρ+δ)(t−TN ))+ e(ρ+δ)(t−TN )TN (ρ+ δ)(1− γ)],
and leads us to the developing countries’ non-cooperative emissions, for t ∈ [0, TN ]:
eNC2 (t) = α2−µ
β2
TN (ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1+t(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t−TN ))+TN (1−γ)(ρ+δ)e(ρ+δ)(t−TN )]
(4.7)
4.2.2 Cooperative Emissions
Consider now, the n1 + n2 cooperators.
As for the non-cooperative case, we proceed backward. So, first of all solve the problem
for t ∈ [TC ,∞):
max
eC1 ,e
C
2
∫ ∞
TC
[
n1
(
α1e
C
1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2
)
+n2
(
α2e
C
2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2
)
−n1β1S−n2β2S+s1n1+s2n2
]
e−ρ(t−T
C)dt,
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subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(
n1e
C
1 (t) +n2e
C
2 (t) + (N1−n1)eNC1 (t) + (N2−n2)eNC2 (t)
)
− δS(t),
S(0) = S0.
We want to highlight that the externality have no effects on the determination of the
emissions. Let v(t, S) be the value function, the HJB equation is
− vt = max
eC1 ,e
C
2
{[
n1
(
α1e
C
1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2
)
+ n2
(
α2e
C
2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2
)
− n1β1S − n2β2S
]
e−ρt+
+vS
[
µ
(
n1e
C
1 + n2e
C
2 + (N1 − n1)eNC1 + (N2 − n2)eNC2
)
− δS
]
+ (s1n1 + s2n2)e
−ρt
}
.
(4.8)
The first order conditions in (4.8) are given by

n1[(α1 − eC1 )e−ρt + µvS ] = 0,
n2[(α1 − eC2 )e−ρt + µvS ] = 0,
from which we can derive the expressions for emissions
eC1 (t) = α1 + µvSe
ρt, eC2 (t) = α2 + µvSe
ρt.
The steps are the same: we choose a guess for value function, then we substitute its
partial derivatives and the emissions in equation (4.8). So, take
v(t, S) = (AS +B)e−ρt,
whose partial derivatives are: vt = −ρ(AS +B)e−ρt and vS = Ae−ρt.
Cooperative emissions, than, are given by
eC1 (t) = α1 + µA, e
C
2 (t) = α2 + µA.
Substituting in (4.8), we can derive an expression for parameter A
ρA = −n1β1 − n2β2 −Aδ,
so that, A = −n1β1+n2β2ρ+δ . Than, the emission solutions for cooperative countries, for
t ∈ [TC ,∞), are given by
eCi (t) = αi − µ
n1β1 + n2β2
ρ+ δ
, i = 1, 2. (4.9)
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Now, we can proceed to find the feedback Nash equilibrium for cooperative players in
the interval [0, TC ].
The different damage-cost function implies that the cooperative solutions solve:
max
eC1 ,e
C
2
∫ TC
0
[
n1
(
α1e
C
1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2
)
+n2
(
α2e
C
2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2
)
−n1β1S−n2γ t
TC
β2S+s1n1+s2n2
]
e−ρtdt,
subject to: S˙(t) = µ
(
n1e
C
1 (t) +n2e
C
2 (t) + (N1−n1)eNC1 (t) + (N2−n2)eNC2 (t)
)
− δS(t),
S(0) = S0. If we denote with v(t, S) the value function, than the HJB equation is
−vt = max
eC1 ,e
C
2
{[
n1
(
α1e
C
1 −
1
2
(eC1 )
2
)
+ n2
(
α2e
C
2 −
1
2
(eC2 )
2
)
− n1β1S − n2γ t
TC
β2S
]
e−ρt+
+vS
[
µ
(
n1e
C
1 + n2e
C
2 + (N1 − n1)eNC1 + (N2 − n2)eNC2
)
− δS
]
+ (s1n1 + s2n2)e
−ρt
}
.
(4.10)
As usual, we compute the first order conditions in (4.10), to obtain a characterization
for cooperative emissions. So

n1[(α1 − eC1 )e−ρt + vSµ] = 0,
n2[(α2 − eC2 )e−ρt + vSµ] = 0,
from which eCi (t) = αi − vSµ, i = 1, 2.
We need to give a guess for value function, and we choose, as in the previous cases, a
linear function of S
v(t, S) = [g(t)S + z(t)]e−ρt,
whose partial derivatives respect t and S are
vt = [(g
′(t)− ρg(t))S + z′(t)− z(t)]e−ρt, vS = g(t)e−ρt.
The expression of vS give us the emission solutions
eCi = αi + µg(t), i = 1, 2.
To conclude the computation of the Nash equilibrium, we need to find an expression
for the function g(t). The way is to substitute vt, vS and ei, i = 1, 2, inside (4.10).
With some algebra, and because of the continuity of value function, we have to solve
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the dynamical system

−g′(t) + (ρ+ δ)g(t) = n1β1 + n2γ tTC β2,
g(TC) = −n1β1+n2β2ρ+δ .
The system has a unique solution g(t), as follows
g(t) = − n1β1
ρ+ δ
− n2β2
TC(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1+t(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t−TC))+TC(1−γ)(ρ+δ)e(ρ+δ)(t−TC)].
Finally, the emissions for cooperative players, when t ∈ [0, TC ], are given by:
eCi (t) = αi−µ
n1β1
ρ+ δ
−µ n2β2
TC(ρ+ δ)2
[
γ
(
1+t(ρ+δ)−e(ρ+δ)(t−TC))+TC(1−γ)(ρ+δ)e(ρ+δ)(t−TC)],
(4.11)
where i = 1, 2. Nevertheless, we will see that externalities will effect the payoffs of the
players.
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4.3 Stability
In order to approach the stability analysis, we use the concept of self-enforcing agree-
ments. The idea is due to [dAs+83], and they use this concept to study the stability of a
cartel. Several times it is used to discuss the stability of environmental agreements. We
want highlight that these conditions are more stringent and there are different papers
that try to propose different ways to face the problem (see [Fin03] and [EF06]). The
basic idea is that a coalition is stable if no one inside has an incentive to defect and no
one outside has an incentive to join in. So, called w the pay-off of a player, a coalition
of k players is stable if are verified:
wCi (k) ≥ wNCi (k − 1), wNCj (k) ≥ wCj (k + 1),
∀i ∈ C and ∀j ∈ NC. First condition is called internal stability, while the second is
called external stability.
In our case, having two different kind of players, we need to adapt the definition, asking
that internal and external stability are verified both for developed and developing coun-
tries. So, we have to find the values n1 and n2 that solve this system of four inequalities:

wC1 (n1, n2) ≥ wNC1 (n1 − 1, n2)
wC2 (n1, n2) ≥ wNC2 (n1, n2 − 1)
wNC1 (n1, n2) ≥ wC1 (n1 + 1, n2)
wNC2 (n1, n2) ≥ wC2 (n1, n2 + 1)
(4.12)
Our interest is to find a stable coalition in the short run, so we focus our analysis in
the period [0, T ]. Unfortunately, we are not able to solve the system analytically, due to
the complexity and the high non linearity of the functions. So, we analyze the problem
from a numerical point of view.
First of all, we have to select values for parameters. Given the similarities, we use the
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same calibration of [Bah+09], according to the MERGE 1. This model divides world in
nine region: Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ); China; Eastern Europe and
former Soviet Union (EEFSU); India; Japan; Mexico and OPEC countries (MOPEC);
USA; Western Europe (WEUR) and the rest of the world (ROW). To make our anal-
ysis, we use Western Europe and India as representatives of developed countries and
developing countries. So we have
α1 = 993, α2 = 334, β1 = 0.310, β2 = 0.063, δ = 0.0171,
µ = 1, ρ = 0.051, S0 = 390000.
We make two different studies, one with γ = 0 and one with γ = 1. Moreover, we suppose
to have a world with N1 = 50 developed countries and N2 = 50 developing countries.
We want to test if the stability conditions (4.12) are verified for different combinations
of n1 and n2. So, we first calculate the values of T
N and TC , taking every time Y¯2
as a percentage of the maximal growth possible. After that, we solve the differential
equations for S(t) in the different configurations required by stability conditions.
Having all the elements we need, we can proceed with the simulation of stability. We
evaluate for 64 different combinations of variables n1 and n2, defining n1 = 1 + 7i and
n2 = 1+7j, with i, j = 1, ..., 7. Our evaluation is on the positivity of stability conditions
(4.12), written as difference between welfares
wC1 (n1, n2)− wNC1 (n1 − 1, n2) ≥ 0,
wC2 (n1, n2)− wNC2 (n1, n2 − 1) ≥ 0,
wNC1 (n1, n2)− wC1 (n1 + 1, n2) ≥ 0,
wNC2 (n1, n2)− wC2 (n1, n2 + 1) ≥ 0.
Example 4.1. We consider first the case without externality.
Stability analysis is presented in figure 4.1 and 4.2 when γ = 0 and in figure 4.3 and
4.4 when γ = 1. Figures can be interpreted as follows: on the x axis we have the
combinations of n1 and n2 given by the 64 permutations of the indeces i, j. So, x = 1 is
given by i = 0, j = 0; x = 2 is given by i = 0, j = 1 and so on.
On the y axis there are the values of stability conditions, for each combination of n1
and n2. Then, the stability conditions are verified if the points lie in first quadrant,
1Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects of Green House Gases reductions (see
[MMR95]).
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while are not verified if lie in the fourth quadrant. In the case γ = 0 the internal
stability is verified only for small coalition, but for those size there’s not external stability.
Increasing the size of the coalition leads internal instability. Then, it’s not possible have
a stable coalition of any size. When γ = 1, instead, the internal stability condition is
never verified.
So, for that choice of parameters we can’t have a stable coalition without externality.
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Example 4.2. Now we come to the case of externality.
What we observed here is that the solution are strictly related to the value of externality
parameters, s1 and s2. We found that if these parameters assume a value that is at least
close to 0.6 of, respectively, α1 and α2, the only stable coalition is the grand coalition.
Than, we assume
s1 = 595.8 s2 = 200.4.
As we can see from figure 4.5 and 4.6, for γ = 0, and from figure 4.7 and 4.8, for γ = 1,
the internal stability is always verified, while we never have the external stability.
So, all the players have the incentive to join in coalition.
On the other side, if the externality is not sufficiently large, than the positive effect is
not enough to have a self-enforcing agreement.
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